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Abstract 
 
 
I examine the impact of a health insurance program for the poor implemented in 
Indonesia in 2005 on labor supply and informal work measured by employment status 
outside of the private and public formal sector. As a first step to its ambitious plan for 
universal coverage, this program extended subsidized health insurance coverage to a 
large proportion of Indonesia’s poor and near-poor population. Using a rich longitudinal 
survey, I estimate the average treatment effect on the treated using a combined 
propensity score matching method with difference in differences. The richness of the data 
allows me to control for a set of observable characteristics used by the government to 
allocate the benefit as well as an extensive combination of controls at the individual, 
household and community level. I find a significant negative impact on labor force 
participation. This impact is driven by women, both at the intensive and extensive margin 
of labor supply. These results are in line with the fact that individuals with higher value for 
health insurance are more inclined to modify their labor market behavior. This decrease 
of labor force participation has important policy implications as it may cause a negative 
impact on economic development, poverty and socio-economic status of women. The 
results are not suggestive of an impact on informality. This lack of an effect on informal 
status is encouraging for developing countries in the verge of implementing universal care 
reform.
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
Several developing countries have pushed towards expanding health insurance 
coverage to universal levels in recent years. Member nations of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) vowed, in 2005, to reform their health systems in order to enhance 
access to health services for their populations and promote financial protection through 
expanded coverage (WHO, 2010). In most developing countries, health insurance 
coverage is provided exclusively through the formal labor market following a contributory 
“Bismarckian” model in which the insurance is financed by tax contributions that are levied 
from employers and employees (Frolich, Kaplan, Pages, Rigolini, and Robalino, 2014). 
This system leaves a large proportion of the population without coverage, increasing the 
financial risk from illness. The World Health Organization estimates that, each year, more 
than 100 million individuals are forced into poverty due to financial catastrophe, having to 
make unexpected out-of-pocket expenditures for expensive emergency care (WHO, 
2010). 
In order to deal with this issue, some low and middle-income countries have 
expanded coverage to the remaining population through subsidized schemes financed 
from general tax revenues. Two prominent examples of such expansions are Mexico’s 
Seguro Popular1 and the Thai Universal Care Scheme2 (30 Bahts Scheme). Seguro 
                                                          
1 See Bosch, Cobacho and Pages (2012) for a background on the health insurance reform in Mexico. 
2 See Hanvoravongchai (2013) for a description of the health insurance program in Thailand. 
2 
 
Popular, established in 2003, provided a comprehensive benefit package of broad health 
services for about 50 million Mexicans formerly uncovered and, as a consequence, 
Mexico reached near universal coverage levels (Bosch et al. 2012). In 2001, the 
government of Thailand introduced the 30 Bahts Scheme, a universal health care 
coverage program, by extending coverage to 18.5 million previously uninsured Thais 
(Towse, 2004). Indonesia showed similar intent in recent years, through the 
implementation of its Health Insurance for the Poor (Askeskin3) program. It sets the first 
step towards universal health coverage. 
Indonesia implemented one of the largest health insurance expansions in the 
developing world. Following the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the government of 
Indonesia decided to invest in safety net programs in order to protect the chronic poor 
and vulnerable near poor from the adverse impacts of the crisis (Sumarto and Bazzi, 
2011). This led to the Social Security Reform of 2004, which paved the way for universal 
health care through the introduction of Askeskin in 2005. This subsidized health insurance 
program targeted the poor and near poor and was designed to complement previously 
provided social health insurance schemes for public and private sector employees. Unlike 
the social insurance schemes for these employees, Askeskin was entirely funded by the 
government (Sparrow, Suryahadi and Widyanti, 2013), and hence, did not require a 
contribution from the recipients. 
There has been an ongoing debate among policymakers on whether large 
expansions of health insurance can have unintended impacts on the labor market 
                                                          
3 Askeskin stands for Asuransi Kesehatan Masyarakat Miskin or Health Insurance for the Poor. Health 
Insurance for the Poor and Askeskin will be used interchangeably for the purpose of this study. 
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decisions of households in low and middle-income countries. In particular, economists 
conjectured two potential key effects, a movement of workers towards the informal sector 
of the labor market and a decrease in labor supply (Wagstaff and Manachotphong, 2012). 
The rationale behind such effects is intuitive. First, the existence of such noncontributory 
programs render informal employment more attractive since fringe benefit contribution is 
not required (Duval and Smith, 2011). Askeskin provides a comprehensive benefit 
package free of charge, and holding everything else equal, renders informal employment 
relatively more appealing. Therefore, I expect an effect on the decision to uptake informal 
jobs at the margin. Second, government subsidized health insurance provides less 
incentives to work for individuals that place a high value on health insurance. For 
individuals that value health insurance and spend a considerable amount of their 
resources on health care, the free provision of health insurance is analogous to an 
increase in income. This should affect both the intensive (the quantity of work) and 
extensive margins (the decision to participate) of labor supply negatively. Overall, such 
effects may have adverse impacts on growth and investment, increase risks faced by 
poor households and lead to more poverty and inequality. Moreover, these negative 
behavioral labor responses are possible mechanisms through which safety net programs 
can generate poverty traps and ultimately impede economic development. As a result, 
the presence of these potential effects is worth investigating since the policy implications 
of such effects are important. 
Utilizing the Indonesian Family Life Survey, a rich ongoing longitudinal survey that 
collects a large representative sample at the individual-level, I use a propensity score 
matching method with difference in differences in order to estimate the impact on labor 
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supply and informal status. This methodology has proven efficient to estimate the impact 
of health insurance programs for the poor in Indonesia (Johar, 2009) but has also been 
extensively used in the program evaluation literature on labor outcomes (Smith and Todd, 
2000; Smith and Todd, 2005; Heckman et al., 1997, Heckman et al.,1998). Taking 
advantage of the large countrywide expansion of health insurance to the poor and near 
poor, the analysis does not show evidence an effect on informal status. However, I find 
evidence of an effect on labor supply both at the intensive and extensive margins driven 
by women and individuals living in urban areas. Overall, the results are consistent with 
the fact that individuals that value health insurance more should exhibit a larger impact. 
Such a decrease in labor supply goes against the redistributive and welfare improving 
goals of the program.  
Chapter 2 presents Indonesia’s institutional structure as well as a description of 
the program. Chapter 3 discusses the potential labor impacts of the program. Chapter 4 
provides an overview of the current state of the literature. Chapter 5 describes the 
empirical methodology used in this paper. Chapter 6 introduces the Indonesian Family 
Life Survey and the sample used in the analysis. Chapter 7 exposes preliminary 
regressions. Chapter 8 exhibits the assumption tests, descriptive statistics and the 
results. Chapter 9 displays limitations of the study. Chapter 10 concludes. 
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Chapter Two: Institutional Background and Introduction of Askeskin 
 
 
2.1. Indonesia’s Health Care Environment  
Indonesia is an archipelago that covers over 1.81 million kilometers squared4 and 
consists of more than 17,000 islands. As of 2007, its population counted 232 million 
people, making it the fourth most populated country in the world. It contains a very diverse 
population ethnically, culturally, economically and socially due to its rich history and 
unique geography. Bahasa Indonesian is the official language of the country. As is usually 
the case in low and middle-income countries, it is characterized by a large rural 
population. In 2007, 52 percent of its population lived in rural areas5.The country is divided 
in 33 provinces (since 20066) which are each directed by a governor. The provinces 
encompass 405 districts, distributed into some 6,543 sub-districts in which there are 
almost 75,244 villages7. In 2007, Indonesia’s GDP per capita was 1,860 dollars, making 
it a lower middle-income country. However, the country has since then enjoyed annual 
GDP growth of over 5%8. Indonesia’s total health expenditure is under 3% of GDP in 
20079, which is low compared to the average of OECD countries10. 
                                                          
4 data.worldbank.org 
5 data.worldbank.org 
6 Between 2001 and 2006, the country expanded from 27 to 33 provinces. 
7 depdagri.go.id 
8 data.worldbank.org 
9 data.worldbank.org 
10 www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Briefing-Note-INDONESIA-2014.pdf 
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According to a study conducted by the Indonesian Joint Committee on Reducing 
Maternal and Neonatal Mortality in Indonesia (2013), the Indonesia’s health care system 
is characterized by its focus on primary health care. In 1968, the government introduced 
the Community Health Centers (Puskesmas) as primary health care providers 
(Triratnawati, 2006). These facilities are assisted by hospitals and other types of health 
care centers at the community level. It is at the village level that the most basic level of 
primary care is situated. Most of the facilities are community based and offer the most 
basic level of curative and preventive care. This is usually also the first point of contact 
between patients and providers. The health center has several goals. It emphasizes basic 
preventive and curative care procedures, the promotion of health, sanitation, mother and 
childcare and family planning, and minor emergencies (Joint Committee on Reducing 
Maternal and Neonatal Mortality in Indonesia, 2013). 
Secondary and tertiary care are usually provided based on referrals in Indonesia 
(Harimurti, Pambudi, Pigazzini, and Tandon, 2013). Secondary health care services are 
offered by about 2000 hospitals11 and tertiary health care services are only available at 
the province level and major cities. The higher-level institution in charge of the health care 
monitoring in Indonesia is the Ministry of Health (MoH) whose responsibility is to manage 
health care programs and policy and to oversee the general functioning of the health care 
system (Joint Committee on Reducing Maternal and Neonatal Mortality in Indonesia, 
2013). 
                                                          
11 The Indonesian health care system is a combination of public and private institutions. Indonesia 
comprises 1,632 secondary-care hospitals, of which about (838 private). Indonesia has about 376 tertiary 
hospitals (76 of which are private) (Harimurti, 2013). 
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The Indonesian health care system is characterized by its inequity in access to 
health care. There is a large schism in health care provision between the affluent part of 
the population and the indigent due to uneven distribution of health care services and low 
coverage among the poor. A similar split exists between urban and rural areas. 
2.2. Social Health insurance in Indonesia and Health Insurance for the Poor  
In 1997, Asian countries were hit by a serious financial crisis (Asian Financial 
Crisis), which had severe impacts across the continent. In Indonesia, the situation was 
particularly disastrous, the Indonesian GDP fell by 15% in 1998 (Thomas and 
Frankenberg, 2007) and poverty rate went from 15.7% in 1996 to 27.1% in 1999 
(Suriyahadi and Sumarto, 2003). In order to tackle rising poverty rates, Indonesia 
established several programs to protect its population. These social assistance programs 
were aimed to support the poor and vulnerable12. They were designed to pull the poor out 
of poverty and prevent the vulnerable from becoming poor. This desire to reduce poverty 
would later lead to the introduction of the Health Insurance for the Poor or Askeskin (this 
will be one of the largest program in scale and in terms of resources allocated). Before 
the introduction of Askeskin, only about 10% of the population had coverage, generally 
through the formal sector of the labor market (Sparrow et al, 2013). Health Insurance for 
the Poor was introduced as part of the larger goal to cover the entire population. It is 
considered a first step to universal health care coverage. In fact, unlike other temporary 
social safety net programs, the vision for Askeskin was long-term. Askeskin was meant 
                                                          
12 Several programs were introduced across several years after the crisis, most notable ones being: The 
subsidized rice program (Raskin), Health insurance for the Poor (Askeskin), the cash transfers for poor 
students (BSM), a conditional cash transfer (PKH), the temporary (unconditional) cash transfer (BLT) and 
the Health Card program. 
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to provide a level of coverage similar to ones enjoyed by formal sector employees, and 
provide long-term health coverage to the bulk of its uncovered population.  
The social security and health insurance system in Indonesia has historically been 
insufficient. This lack of adequate protection represented a paramount challenge for 
Indonesia. Individuals used their extended family or their communities as last resort to 
seek protection (ILO, 2008). This precariousness and uncertainty exacerbated poverty, ill 
health and lead to higher mortality (ILO, 2008). Since health insurance was only limited 
to the formal employment sector, which accounts for a small proportion of the labor 
market, a large majority of workers were excluded from coverage. This kept the 
population vulnerable to impoverishment. In order to understand the institutional 
environment in Indonesia prior to the introduction of Askeskin, the next section introduces 
the existing formal sector schemes: Askes and Jamsostek.  
2.2.1. Askes 
Askes is a contributory social security scheme for public sector workers, which 
includes comprehensive health insurance coverage among other programs (employment 
injury, death insurance, pension and retirement) (ILO, 2009). It was introduced in 1968 in 
order to provide comprehensive protection for civil servants against several risks. In 2007, 
Askes covered about 8.28% of the population13.  It represents approximatively 19.2 million 
people. The contributions that fund this program are split between employees and 
employers, who each pay 2% of the base salary. In terms of health insurance coverage, 
Table 1 shows that the program provides comprehensive coverage for both outpatient 
                                                          
13 Based on authors’ estimates from the fourth wave of the Indonesian Family Life Survey. 
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and inpatient care exclusively through public providers and requires copayments for 
certain medical services. Askes also covers the armed forces and police through a 
separate fund called Asabri (ILO, 2009). This program is funded both through 
contributions from beneficiaries and government subsidies. 
2.2.2. Jamsostek 
Jamsostek is a social security program for employees operating in the private 
sector and insurance four types of risk: old age, work-related injury, health, and death 
(ILO, 2009).  In 2007, Jamsostek covered approximatively 4.84% of the population14.This 
represents about 11.18 million individuals. In this scheme, the burden of the premium is 
borne only by the employer at a level of either of 3% or 6% percent depending on whether 
the employee has dependents or not, respectively (Aji et al., 2013). This scheme extends 
a comprehensive benefit package. It offers access to both public and private facilities for 
outpatient care but only public facilities for inpatient care (ABD, 2007). It is mandatory for 
firms that have ten workers or more or a payroll of over one million rupiahs per month15. 
However, there is an option to choose private insurance if the employer can provide better 
coverage to their employees (Thabrany, 2011). This led to certain firms with more than 
ten workers to provide cheaper alternative coverage through the private insurance 
market. As a result, Jamsostek suffered from relatively low take up.  Moreover, the 
enforcement of the mandate was not perfect even among firms with more than ten 
workers leading to some workers not having coverage altogether. Several issues affected 
the enforcement of the mandate. ILO (2008) points out that the private sector suffered 
                                                          
14 Based on authors’ estimates from the Fourth Wave Indonesian Family Life Survey. 
15 https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2010-2011/asia/indonesia.html 
10 
 
from contribution evasion through under declaration of contributory wages which led to 
some workers working for formal firms without being formally registered. In addition, 
Jamsostek lacked proper monitoring and suffered from insufficient resource allocation 
which caused various abuses. There were no inspectors under its supervision to ensure 
compliance, and its monitoring depended on the labor inspectors that roll under the 
regional government to ensure the proper application of the legislation. This understaffing 
led to compliance issues (ILO, 2008).   
2.2.3. Private Health Insurance 
As it is usually the case in developing countries, private health insurance markets 
are underdeveloped and prohibitively expensive for the majority of the population. In most 
countries, they provide a negligible part of the population’s health coverage. In Indonesia, 
there is a private health insurance market, but it only accounts for less than 1% of the 
population (based on the fourth wave of the Indonesian Family Life Survey) and, hence, 
I forgo describing it in detail for the purpose of this study. 
2.2.4. The Health Insurance for the Poor (Askeskin) 
Before the introduction of Askeskin, health insurance coverage in Indonesia was 
low and Indonesian authorities realized the need to reform the system. In August 1998, 
in the midst of the Asian Financial Crisis, the government made an attempt at increasing 
coverage for the poor through reforming and revitalizing a previously existing fee waiver 
program (Health Card16 program) for public health care facilities (Sparrow, 2008). The 
purpose of this program was to provide indigent households basic health care provision 
                                                          
16 The Health Card program was originally implemented in 1994 to cover the poorest Indonesians. 
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at the community level. However, it provided only a limited benefit package and had 
several organizational issues.  The program was discontinued in 2005 to pave the way to 
Askeskin (World Bank, 2006). In 2004, the Indonesian government ratified the National 
Social Security System Law, which confirmed the aspiration of the government to expand 
social health insurance to a universal level (ILO, 2008). The first step towards this goal 
was the establishment of the Askeskin program, which targeted the poor and near poor. 
It was implemented in the beginning of 2005 and made substantial progress in the first 
year of implementation. The target setting and implementation of the program followed 
several steps. 
From the beginning of January to the end of May 2005, the government set a target 
of 36.1 million enrolled individuals. This number represented the initial estimate of the 
poor population in Indonesia by the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS17). This amounted 
to about 17 percent of the population. The benefit was allocated at the district level, with 
districts-level quotas based on an estimate of the number of indigent individuals per 
district. Local authorities played an active role as they delivered lists of qualifying 
individuals to local branches of Askes (the state-owned social insurance body in charge 
of providing the benefit) (ILO, 2008). After June 2005, the government decided to increase 
the target to 76.4 million individuals in order to include the near poor in this program (ILO, 
2008). Based on data from the fourth wave of the Indonesian Family Life Survey, about 
18.4% of the population received the benefit by the end of 2007 (this represents about 43 
                                                          
17 Central Bureau of Statistics and BPS will be used interchangeably in this study. 
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million individuals). Table 2 shows health insurance coverage before and after this 
reform. 
Figure 1 and Table 3 show the trend in public health expenditure between 1995 
and 2007 based on World Bank estimates (2008).  Health expenditure as a fraction of 
total national spending rose from 2.6 percent in 2001 to 4.2 percent in 2005 (the year of 
implementation of the Askeskin). The years following the implementation of Askeskin up 
to the end of 2007 exhibit a large increase in public health expenditure. In fact, real 
national health expenditures more than doubled from an initial 9.3 trillion rupiahs (about 
1 billion dollars) in 2001, to 20.1 trillion rupiahs (about 2.1 billion dollars) in 2007. These 
figures provide evidence of the scale of the program and the important material impact 
associated with it.  
Askeskin covered health services from the primary to the tertiary level. More 
precisely, it provided free outpatient and inpatient care at public health centers and 
hospitals, but it also offered access to a third of private health facilities (ILO, 2008; 
Sparrow et al., 2013). Secondary provider claims (hospitals) were paid through a limited 
negotiable fee-for-service, whereas primary health centers were compensated based on 
capitation18.  
            Targeting for the allocation of membership in Askeskin was based on district level 
targeting in which eligible individuals were selected within a specific district. The 
mechanism used within each district was based on a proxy-means tested method 
computed by the Central Bureau of Statistics (Harimurti et al., 2013). This proxy-means 
                                                          
18 It is a health care payment system based on a fixed fee per patient per unit of time paid to the physician 
for the delivery of medical care.  
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tested score was used to determine district quotas. It is composed of the weighted 
average of several poverty indicators that were provided by the Central Bureau of 
Statistics19.  The targeting and eligibility process is described in detail in Section 2.3. 
  The financing of the program was based on a monthly premium paid by the central 
government of an amount of 5,000 rupiahs (approximately US$ 0.50) with no contribution 
from individual beneficiaries (ILO, 2008). It was paid for mainly by savings from fuel 
subsidy removal (Perdana, 2014). The entire budget that the government allotted for 2005 
was set at 3 trillion Rupiahs (around US$ 300 million). PT Askes, a state insurance 
company, pooled risk at the district level.  
Table 1 provides a description of the specific characteristics of the three different 
health insurance schemes (Askes, Jamsostek, Askeskin). The benefit package provided 
through Askeskin is more comprehensive than the other schemes (Aji et al, 2003). Table 
2 provides the proportion of individuals enrolled in the main health insurance programs 
before and after the implementation of Askeskin based on the fourth Wave of the 
Indonesian Family Life Survey. Two years after its implementation, it became the largest 
health insurance program in size in Indonesia. 
Askeskin has been shown to improve access to health care and consumption of 
outpatient care by the poor (Sparrow et al., 2013).  Aji et al. (2013) explore the impact of 
all Indonesian schemes on out-of-pocket expenses and find that Askeskin decreased out-
of-pocket spending by 34%. They also find that Askes decreased out-of-pocket 
expenditures by 54% whereas Jamsostek did not have any effect on out-of-pocket 
                                                          
19 Appendix A provides a description of the computation used in the proxy means tested score. 
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expenditures. This shows that Askeskin has had meaningful success in ameliorating 
access to health services and relieving households from financial costs of health care.  
2.3. Targeting Mechanism and Eligibility 
Targeting was decentralized at the district level (geographic targeting) where 
resources were allocated to district officials to select eligible households within each 
district (Sparrow, 2013). The poor and near poor were targeted through proxy-means 
testing and criteria from local governments (Harimurti et al., 2013). 
2.3.1. Proxy-Means Testing Score Calculation 
In order to effectively reach the intended population for the safety net programs, 
the government needed to create a reliable targeting mechanism that could distinguish 
the poor and near poor from the non-poor. Effective targeting increases the chances that 
the correct households (poor and near poor) will receive assistance. However, the 
government lacked data on key metrics to properly identity households. In fact, in 
developing countries, due to widespread informality, significant household production, 
and absence of reliable data, it is problematic to produce a dependable measure of 
income. Households are more likely to underreport their income and attempt to appear 
as poor in order to be eligible for social welfare programs. Therefore, it is common that 
the governments of low and middle-income countries use a statistical method called 
proxy-means testing in order to identify poor and near-poor households.  
Proxy means testing uses data on household characteristics to proxy for 
household income, consumption or expenditures.  The evident benefit of proxy means 
testing is that, in low and middle income countries, “good” predictors of welfare such as 
socio-economic characteristics, demographic characteristics, housing characteristics, 
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and ownership of household durables are easier to gather and verify than direct measures 
like income. There is evidence that proxy means testing is among the most effective 
targeting methods (Alatas, Banerjee, Hanna, Olken, and Tobias, 2011). Coady, Grosh 
and Hoddinott (2004) assess several cash transfer programs in developing countries. The 
study finds that it performs better in targeting households than many other methods. 
 Cameron and Shah (2014) provide an excellent description of the proxy means 
tested methodology used for targeting in Indonesia. It was implemented to better target 
all safety net programs in Indonesia from 2005 on. It was first intended and utilized for the 
Unconditional Cash Transfer program (BLT) which started in 2005, ran for 12 months 
(from 2005 to 2006) and provided 10$ a month to 19 million poor and near poor 
households (a total of $120). In order to target households, the Central Bureau of 
Statistics (BPS in Indonesian) conducted a National Poverty Census Survey (PSE05) in 
order to assess the poverty status of households based on observable characteristics. In 
order to produce the survey, the government first combined data from the comprehensive 
annual Susenas20 survey for three consecutive years prior to the introduction of the cash 
transfer program “to identify 14 variables that together had the greatest capacity to predict 
household expenditure” (Cameron and Shah, 2014). This identification process relied on 
running logit regressions models for each of the districts in Indonesia (Cameron and 
Shah, 2014). The variables identified for this purpose were:  
1) Households floor area 
2) Households floor type 
                                                          
20 The National Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS) are large-scale multi-purpose socioeconomic 
household surveys. They were introduced in 1963-1964 and been fielded on a yearly basis. It is a rotating 
panel of a sample of 60000 individuals (www.rand.org). 
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3) Type of wall 
4) Type of toilet facility 
5) Water source 
6) Source of lighting 
7) Type of cooking fuel 
 8) Frequency of meat consumption 
 9) Frequency of food consumption 
10) Frequency of clothes purchase 
11) Accessibility to health center 
12) Household head education level 
13) Household head employment sector 
14) Presence and ownership of five different durable assets: television, motor vehicle 
savings account, livestock and precious metals. 
  This process produced district-level weights that were subsequently used to 
compute a value for the score at the household level. The survey was then tailored for 
the collection of those data. Appendix A provides a description of the construction of the 
index. In my analysis of Askeskin, I use the original weights computed by the BPS in the 
production of the proxy means tested score21. 
2.3.2. Overall Targeting Method 
As mentioned above, the targeting was implemented at the district-level. The BPS 
requested lists of potential poor households from community leaders and village officials. 
Then, the BPS sent enumerators to those villages to assess their poverty level using the 
                                                          
21 The weights were provided for this analysis by the BPS. 
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PSE05 Survey. After collection of the data, it was sent to the BPS headquarters where 
the district level weights were used to assign each household a score (Cameron and 
Shah, 2014). The eligibility of each household was based on that score. Households 
meeting a certain cut-off point were considered to be indigent or near poor. 
Following this process, the national government (BPS) produced lists of eligible 
households based on the estimated number of poor households in the district. They also 
produced quotas from those lists, which they delivered to the district governments 
(Harimurti et al., 2013). The district governments then confirmed those data using their 
own methods to meet their budget and quotas. They then delivered the final lists to PT 
Askes (state-owned social insurance enterprise) which produced cards to be disbursed 
at the community level (by local branches of PT Askes). Askeskin started before the 
proxy-means tested score was implemented22. As a result of the unavailability of the data 
in the first semester of Askeskin’s implementation, the proxy-means tested score was 
only used starting around the end of 2005 and onwards. Therefore, in practice, even 
though many districts used the proxy-means tested method; there were variations across 
districts and communities in the way households were targeted. If the proxy-means tested 
score was not used, districts generally used a subset of the indicators related to the ones 
in the proxy-means tested method or criteria based on the Health Card program23. 
However, there is anecdotal evidence that in some villages the allocation was needs 
                                                          
22  It was first used in the BLT program that started in October 2005. 
23 The Health Card program used the criteria from the National Family Planning Coordination Board 
(BKKBN), which were used to allocate several social programs prior to Askeskin. This targeting method is 
based on five basic needs criteria (food consumption, the quality of the house’s building materials, 
ownership of clothes, and religious practices, households head educational status) (ASEAN and World 
Bank, 2009). Households are deemed poor if five one basic needs condition is not met. This information is 
collected on a census basic across the whole country. 
 
18 
 
based. Bachtiar, Wibisana and Pujiyanto (2006) indicate that, in some cases, Askeskin 
was allocated based on health status.  
In evaluating the targeting of Askeskin, Sparrow et al. (2013) find that Askeskin 
was successful at targeting the “poor and those most vulnerable to catastrophic out-of-
pocket health payments” (Sparrow et al., 2013). Even though there was evidence of 
leakage, Askeskin targets the poor accurately since about 70% Askeskin recipients are 
part of the 40% least well off of the country (Sparrow et al., 2013). 
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Chapter Three: Health Insurance for the Poor and Potential Labor Market  
 
Outcomes 
 
 
The Health insurance for the Poor has the potential to affect the labor market 
decisions of households on several dimensions. Providing free health benefits may affect 
the decision of searching for jobs, supplying one’s labor and choosing between formal 
and informal employment (Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, and Pages, 2012). This study 
focuses on examining the potential effects on an individual’s decision to work and, 
conditional on working, on the individual’s decision to take up informal sector 
employment.  
3.1. Labor Supply 
3.1.1. Model of the Decision between Employment and Non Employment  
Provision of government-subsidized health insurance is equivalent to an increase 
in income as it increases the value of non-monetary benefits from unemployment and 
reduces the opportunity cost of non-employment. In fact, the decision of reducing the 
quantity of work or dropping out of the labor force entirely would partially depend on the 
value that the individuals associate to the benefit. The more comprehensive the coverage 
and the lower the contribution, the higher the perceived benefit and value to the recipient.  
The more a person values the benefit offered, the more important the expected effect on 
labor supply. 
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I modify a model by Azuara and Marinescu (2013) used to characterize the impact 
of Seguro Popular on informality in order to illustrate the decision of employment versus 
non-employment. Let us assume that the utility from working is given by: 
𝑈𝑒 = 𝑤𝑒 + 𝛿ℎ𝑒 
Where 𝑤𝑒 is the wage rate received if the individual decides to take up employment, ℎ𝑒 is 
the non-monetary benefits received from working, and 𝛿 is the value that workers place 
on an unit of non-monetary benefits. 
The utility from non-employment is given by:  
𝑈𝑛 = 𝜌𝑛 + 𝛿ℎ𝑛  
Where 𝜌𝑛 is the benefit from non-employment (psychic benefit) and, ℎ𝑛 is a non-
monetary benefit received by the individual such as Askeskin in the case of Indonesia.  
The individual will choose not to work if 𝑈𝑛 − 𝑈𝑒 > 0  𝑜𝑟 (𝜌𝑛 − 𝑤𝑒) + 𝛿(ℎ𝑛 − ℎ𝑒)>0. 
The implementation of Askeskin increases the value of non-monetary benefits from 
unemployment (represented by ℎ𝑛) because it provides a comprehensive benefit package 
without cost sharing and no contributions (premiums, copayment or deductibles). In fact, 
considering Table 1, it appears that the program is at least as generous as the formal 
sector programs previously in place. In addition, the benefit gives access to any public 
health center in the country and some private health centers. It also covers all dependents 
in the household as well as the spouse. Hence, everything else held equal, a person 
receiving the health insurance benefit is more likely to choose not to participate as 
opposed to participate.  A decrease in labor supply, because of the introduction of 
Askeskin, is expected. 
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The effect of Askeskin also depends on the value of 𝛿. In particular, the more a 
person values health insurance, the more important the expected effect on labor supply. 
As a result, groups that have higher propensity of health care consumption or higher 
probability of illness should be particularly affected. For instance, women of childbearing 
age (particularly married women) and older individuals should have a higher valuation of 
health insurance. Older individuals consume more health care products and services and 
have a higher probability of suffering from a health issue. This results in a higher 
associated value to health insurance and a higher potential sensitivity of labor supply to 
provision of health insurance. Women of childbearing age might have a higher value for 
health insurance since they expect to spend considerable amounts on health care due to 
the costs of health care services related to pregnancy and childcare. In some cases, they 
might even be responsible for the health care of their spouse. They are therefore more 
likely to reduce their labor supply24. This trade-off between homemaking/childcare and 
labor market activities is even more important in a developing country context.   
3.1.2. Labor Supply of Women 
In Indonesia, the labor force condition of women is particularly precarious. They 
suffer from less job security due to the uncertainty of their employment and as a result to 
lower and less stable social security coverage. Therefore, women’s health insurance 
coverage is uncertain as it depends on their ability to hold their position (if their job 
provides health insurance) or on their ability to benefit from the coverage of their spouse. 
                                                          
24 In their review of the U.S. literature on the impact of health insurance on labor supply, Gruber 
and Madrian (2002), conclude that “health insurance is an important determinant of the labor behavior” of 
individuals of retirement age and married women.   
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In 2007, they had significantly lower labor force participation than men (50% vs 80%) and 
sustained a higher unemployment rate than men (11.8 percent vs 8.5% respectively) 
(ILO, 2008). Women workers had a higher likelihood of working in the informal sector 
(61% for men vs 68% for women) and to partake in unpaid activities. Dependence on 
work in the informal economy results in them being less likely to be protected by social 
security systems, even though they are more exposed to risks related to their role in the 
family and their life cycle. Therefore, their vulnerability would lead to a higher value for 
health insurance. This relative vulnerability should be reflected by a higher value of 𝛿 
(which, all else held equal, would lead to a higher impact on labor supply). 
3.1.3. The Intensive Margin of Labor Supply 
As mentioned above, the provision of Askeskin could affect the decision to 
participate in the labor force. This decision between employment and unemployment is 
referred to as the extensive margin of labor supply. Nevertheless, health insurance 
expansion may also affect the intensive margin of labor supply (hours worked or weeks 
worked) if the person is employed. The labor supply effect could be observed on the 
intensive margin where individuals decrease their quantity of time working as the “extra” 
income that would be spent on health insurance and health care is saved.  This would 
lead to the substitution of some labor market time to either leisure, house-care or family 
caring activities as health insurance reduces the costs of health care and the probability 
of catastrophic loss due to an unexpected event.  This is relevant in the case of Indonesia 
since households, especially poor and near-poor households, spend a relatively 
significant fraction of their income to purchase health care products and services. Poor 
households are also more likely to suffer from catastrophic health spending. As such, they 
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place a high value on health insurance coverage. In many cases, individuals cannot afford 
to completely drop out of the labor force and therefore the impact may be only observed 
at the intensive margin where certain members of the households decide to reduce their 
time spent in labor activities to partake in other activities. 
3.2. Labor Informality 
3.2.1. Model of the Decision between Formal and Informal Work 
The provision of health insurance does not only have the potential to affect the 
decision to work and the amount of working, but it also has the potential to affect the 
sector in which the individual decides to provide his labor. The extension of subsidized 
health insurance beyond the formal sector of the labor market increases the “implied 
wage” in the informal sector.  As a result, holding everything else equal, a person 
receiving the health insurance benefit is more likely to choose informal employment over 
formal employment since the utility from informal work increases due to the fringe benefit 
provision. 
In their study of Seguro Popular, Azuara and Marinescu (2013) present a simple 
model to illustrate the potential impact of subsidized health insurance availability on the 
decision between formal and informal work.   
Let us assume that the utility of working in a formal job is as follow: 
𝑈𝑓 = 𝑤𝑓 + 𝛾ℎ𝑓 
Where 𝑤𝑓 is the formal sector wage, ℎ𝑓 are non-monetary benefits received by formal 
sector employees, and 𝛾 is the value of non-monetary benefits to workers. Likewise, the 
utility of being employed in the informal sector follows the below relationship: 
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𝑈𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 + 𝛾ℎ𝑖 
For a person to choose to work in the informal sector the following condition needs 
to hold: 
𝑈𝑖 − 𝑈𝑓 > 0   𝑜𝑟  𝑤𝑖 − 𝑤𝑓 + 𝛾(ℎ𝑖 − ℎ𝑓) > 0 
The introduction of Askeskin increases the value of benefits in the informal sector 
(represented by ℎ𝑖) increasing the utility from informal work. Therefore, a person 
receiving the health insurance benefit is more likely to choose informal employment over 
formal employment. 
Theoretically, this effect could emerge in Indonesia for two reasons. First, the 
introduction of Health Insurance for the Poor should have increased the value of 
ℎ𝑛 because it provides a comprehensive benefit package (comparable to those 
available for public sector employees and private sector employees), with no premium 
and without cost sharing. Moreover, it is portable (giving access to any public health 
center in the country and some private health centers) and covers all dependents. In 
addition, firms in the formal sector are only required to cover their employees if they 
have more than ten workers.  Therefore, there are workers in registered firms that are 
not covered by social security or health insurance.  
3.2.2. Informal Work and Segmentation of the Labor Market 
This effect is expected to be observed only if the labor market in Indonesia is 
integrated (there is no segmentation between the informal sector and formal sector of the 
labor market). The labor market in developing countries is viewed as a dual market where 
the formal sector is a superior choice (with a greater potential for earnings), whereas the 
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informal sector is considered as unattractive and transitory (in wait for a “better” formal job). 
The informal sector can comprise a wide range of jobs from assembly and manufacturing 
unregistered workers in larger registered and unregistered firms (for example in the 
garment and construction industry), agricultural or mining seasonal workers, small 
producers or petty traders such as street vendors to a range of casual employment 
arrangements. Informal work can be found in most industries in developing countries. In 
some cases, the informal economy also consists of small-scale entrepreneurs that have 
a substantial capacity for innovation and growth. The formal sector is composed of 
workers in both smaller and larger firms in the private sector as well as the public sector. 
For example, employees for large corporations and smaller registered companies in 
virtually all industries as well as individuals working in civil services, public sector units 
and government services are all considered formal sector employees. Liberal professions 
such as doctors, lawyers and architects would also be part of formal sector employment. 
 The formal sector cannot absorb all employees that wish to enter it because wages 
are set above market clearing levels due to structural or institutional factors. The jobs are 
limited and the demand for formal jobs is greater than the supply. Thus, not all individuals 
that demand a formal sector job can obtain one. This rationing leads to workers being 
excluded from the formal sector, which pushes them to integrate informal jobs instead.  The 
latter accommodates those who are incapable of integrating a formal sector job but need 
to work until they can find better employment.  
There is an extensive literature on the nature of formal and informal labor markets 
in developing countries. Harris and Todaro (1970) model the segmentation of the market 
in developing countries, with a more desirable formal sector, in order to explain the labor 
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movements from rural to urban areas in developing countries.  Fields (1975) introduces 
an urban informal sector to characterize the labor market accurately in a developing 
country’s urban setting. In his work, the urban informal sector serves as “transitory” 
employment for individuals that are unable to find formal sector jobs and need to remain 
employed for survival purposes.  This mainstream dual market framework has framed 
labor market policy in several developing countries, in which government institutions have 
tried to reduce the size of the informal labor sector by reforming labor market institutions 
and laws.   
More recent research went against the idea that informal work is an employment 
of last resort and represented the informal labor market as a sector in which individuals 
decide to work intentionally in order to make themselves better off.  Magnac (1991) shows 
that earnings differential that is observed between the informal and formal sector is due 
to unobserved heterogeneity between employees. Thus, controlling for unobserved 
characteristics, wages are not different between the two sectors.  Using longitudinal data 
from Mexico, Maloney (1999) claims that a portion of informal workers in Mexico willingly 
take up jobs in the informal sector and are not actively queuing for formal sector jobs.  
Previous research has argued that informality could be beneficial as it allows the 
provision of employment for everyone that needs a job. For instance, it can provide 
flexible work arrangements for women that need proximity to their household for family 
reasons (Alatas & Newhouse, 2010) or low-skilled workers that need employment for 
subsistence and meeting their family’s needs. Therefore, the informal sector may play a 
favorable role as it can absorb a large proportion of the population that are vulnerable to 
financial risks and help them subsist. Nevertheless, a large empirical literature finds that 
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an increasing informal sector may cause lower economic growth, low tax revenues and 
public goods provision. 
In the case of Indonesia, the current consensus among researchers is that the 
labor market is segmented and informal jobs are “inferior” as workers in the informal 
sector would prefer to access a formal sector job. The informal sector is seen to 
perpetuate poverty, because wages are lower than they would be in the formal sector 
(Newhouse and Alatas, 2010), they do not offer employment security and do not cover 
them against risks of illness, disability, old age, disability and death (OECD 2008; ILO 
2008).  The Indonesian government has made a priority of limiting the size of the informal 
sector through structural or institutional reform tailored towards the creation of more 
formal sector jobs (Newhouse and Alatas, 2010). However, recently, using the Indonesian 
Family Life Survey, Sharma (2013) finds that the Indonesian labor market does not exhibit 
a wage differential after controlling for firm size. This new evidence indicates the 
possibility that the Indonesian Labor market is integrated.  Therefore, more research is 
required to reach a definite answer on the nature of the Indonesian labor market. This is 
an important question, as the extent to which the Health Insurance for the Poor or any 
future program can distort the labor market incentives is directly dependent on the 
structural differences between formal and informal sector. 
 
  
  
 
 
28 
 
 
 
Chapter Four: Literature Review 
 
The goal of this section is to analyze the existing research related to the topic. This 
study relates to two streams of literature that examine the impact of health insurance and 
poverty alleviation programs, respectively, on labor supply and informality. There is 
scarce evidence on the impact of health insurance or poverty alleviation programs on 
labor supply decisions in developing countries. The majority of the literature examines 
this question in the US setting. Even though there is evidence of an impact of health 
insurance expansion on labor supply in the US, it cannot be extended to developing 
countries due to the large heterogeneity in institutional and market structure. The impact 
of health insurance expansions on informality is a topic that has been studied in a limited 
set of low and middle-income countries. This is due to the small number of large-scale 
universal-like health insurance expansions in the developing world. There is suggestive 
evidence of an effect on informality in certain studies. However, the effect is small and 
highly reliant on the structure of the program and the institutional environment of the 
country. This renders the results difficult to generalize to other settings.   
4.1. Social Health Insurance and Labor Market Outcomes in Developing Countries 
It is in the context of Mexico that the topic has been studied the most. Aterido et 
al. (2011) exploited the Mexican Seguro Popular social program to investigate its impact 
on labor market decisions. Seguro Popular (SP) is a social health insurance scheme 
introduced in 2003 that provides coverage to the 55% of the population that are not 
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employed in the formal sector. It was launched as a pilot program but was progressively 
extended across the country. In 2010, the government estimated that every Mexican 
household that was not covered by a formal scheme had coverage through Seguro 
Popular. This study exploits panel data from the National Employment Survey over a 
period of nine years and finds that Seguro Popular reduced the probability of being in the 
formal sector by approximatively half of one percent. Their analysis also uncovers lower 
labor force participation. This is possibly the most robust study on the impact of social 
health insurance on labor market outcomes as it uses panel data to control for individual 
and households fixed effects. It also uses the longest period to study the effect. 
Parker and Scott (2008) utilized the Rand Mexican Family Life Survey panel to 
study the impact of Seguro Popular. They investigate differential effects on informality 
between urban and rural areas. They find a positive effect on the probability of informal 
employment in rural municipalities, but the absolute magnitude of the effect is small. They 
do not observe any effect in urban areas. They also use a data set from the 2000 and 
2005 censuses and do not find any significant results.   
Barros (2008) investigated the effect of Seguro Popular on labor outcomes. He 
used four repeated cross-sectional surveys over the period spanning from 2000 to 2006 
and employed a triple-difference estimation method but did not find significant effects on 
the probability of being in the formal sector, hours worked or on labor force participation. 
Wagstaff and Manachotphong (2012) examine the impact of the roll-out of the 
Universal Health Care reform in Thailand (30 Bahts Scheme). They utilize 68 labor force 
surveys, and exploit the staggered roll-out of the social insurance expansion to identify 
labor market distortions caused by the new universal health care scheme implemented in 
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2001. Their findings indicate that the reform has encouraged employment (mainly for 
married women), has led to reduced formal sector work for married men, and increased 
informality (mainly for married women). 
A notable study by Azuara and Marinescu (2013) examine the impact of Seguro 
Popular on labor informality and wages. They exploit the gradual roll-out at the 
municipality level using a difference in differences estimation and do not find any effect 
of Seguro Popular on informality in the overall population and across the majority of their 
specifications. They do find, though, that informality increases by 1.7% for less educated 
workers.  
There are also several studies of health insurance expansions or poverty 
alleviation programs on informality or other labor outcomes conducted in other Latin 
American countries, Europe or Asia. Camacho, Conover and Hoyos (2009) investigate 
the effect of a subsidized health insurance for the poor (Regimen Subsidiado or SR) in 
Colombia on informality. Regimen Subsidiado, which was implemented in 1993, was 
provided to the poor and the unemployed and was financed from both government funds 
and formal sector contributions. The benefit package provided was less generous than in 
the formal sector but covered all individuals living in the household. Camacho et al. (2009) 
utilize repeated cross sections from the Colombian household survey covering a period 
from 1992 to 2005. Their estimation results indicate an increase in informality after the 
reform of about 4 percentage points.  
Gasparini et al. (2007) do not study a health insurance program but a poverty 
alleviation program with similar expected effects. They investigate the effect of a 
conditional cash transfer program (Programa Jefes de Hoga or PJH), on informal sector 
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employment in Argentina. This program provided 150 pesos to each individual that met 
eligibility criteria on a monthly basis. It targeted poor families and was implemented to 
reduce the level of poverty in Argentina. They use a different estimation strategy that 
exploits observable eligibility criteria. They employ those criteria using matching 
techniques (propensity score matching) and panel data for their empirical strategy. The 
authors use a difference in differences estimation technique in investigating whether 
program recipients are less likely to be employed compared to similar units. They used a 
dataset consisting of two rotating panels from the national household survey and found 
some evidence of an increase in informal sector work but the results were not robust to 
all their specifications. 
Dabalen, Kilicb Kalep and Waly (2008) analyze a poverty alleviation program in 
Albania. Using the 2002 and 2005 waves of a nationally representative survey (Albanian 
Living Standards Measurement Survey), they observe a negative labor supply response 
from the program especially among women and urban residents. They uncover that the 
program decreased the labor supply of urban female workers by, on average, 2.8 hours 
a week and 2.8 weeks a year. They also find that the probability of labor force participation 
declines by 5.8 percent for the full sample. 
A study by Chou and Staiger (2001) examine the impact of health coverage on the 
supply of labor of married women in Taiwan, a middle-income country, and find that 
insurance can be a powerful work incentive. They take advantage of an expansion of 
health insurance to government employees’ spouses. They uncover that the provision of 
insurance led to decrease in labor force participation of married women with a larger 
impact in low-income households.  
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4.2. Social Health Insurance and Labor supply in the US 
The effect of Heath insurance on labor supply and mobility is a topic that has been 
widely studied in the US. Gruber and Madrian (2002) provide an extensive literature 
survey on the impact of health coverage on job mobility and the supply of labor. The 
literature focuses on the impact of health insurance on the labor supply of groups that 
associate a high value to health insurance. These groups comprise older individuals, 
married women and low-income single mothers. Gruber and Madrian (2002) argue that 
health benefits are important to explain retirement decisions. Across studies, health 
insurance increases the likelihood of retirement by 30 to 80%.  For married women, they 
indicate that even though studies are similar in their estimation strategies the literature is 
consistent in finding an effect of health insurance on the labor supply of married women. 
They finally point to the fact that studies of Medicaid on labor supply are inconclusive in 
finding an effect on labor supply of low-income single mothers.  
4.3. Other Studies of the Effects of Health Insurance Expansions in Indonesia 
 Studies that examine the effect of health insurance expansions for the poor in 
Indonesia are relevant to this dissertation. 
 A notable study by Johar (2009) analyses the impact of the Health Card program 
that was introduced in Indonesia in 1994 on the utilization of health care. They exploit the 
propensity score matching with difference in differences method that has been 
extensively utilized in the government programs evaluation on labor outcomes (Smith and 
Todd, 2000; Smith and Todd, 2005; Heckman et al., 1997; Heckman et al., 1998). They 
find little impact of the Health Card program on the utilization of health care. I employ a 
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similar method in this study since it has proven appropriate in previous research on labor 
outcomes. 
 Aji et al. (2013) explore the impact of all the prominent health insurance programs 
in Indonesia on out-of-pocket spending. They find that the introduction of Askeskin led to 
a decrease in out-of-pocket expenditures of 34%. They estimate that Askes decreased 
out-of-pocket expenditures by 54%. However, they did not find any evidence of an effect 
of Jamsostek. This is evidence of the effectiveness of Askeskin in protecting its population 
from health risk. 
 Sparrow et al. (2013) use two waves of a national socioeconomic survey 
(Susenas) and utilize a propensity score matching method with difference in differences 
to study the targeting efficiency of the Askeskin program. They also investigate out-of–
pocket expenditures and access to health care. They show that Askeskin improves 
access to health care and utilization of outpatient care among the poor. The results also 
prove that the targeting was pro-poor. 
4.3. Contribution 
 Evidence of an impact of social insurance or other poverty alleviation programs on 
labor markets in developing countries is scarce.  Only recently have governments of low 
and middle-income countries started showing interest in large-scale health insurance 
expansions. Moreover, due to large differences across health care systems, design of 
health reforms and overall institutional environments, impacts vary from one country to 
another. In fact, the literature focuses on a handful of countries (mainly Mexico) and, as 
a result, studies from other developing nations would contribute significantly to the 
knowledge base. 
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This dissertation contributes to the literature in at least three ways. First, it provides 
new estimates from a different institutional setting. Indonesia’s expansion of health 
insurance to the poor is, in size, one of the largest provisions of health insurance in the 
developing world. The scale of the program and its generosity offers a unique opportunity 
to provide new robust estimates and contribute to the existing knowledge. 
Second, this study departs from the literature by exploiting a propensity score 
matching with difference in differences methodology. This method has been used in the 
study of health insurance for the poor in Indonesia (Johar, 2009) and proven efficient to 
study labor outcomes (Smith and Todd, 2000; Smith and Todd, 2005; Heckman et al., 
1997; Heckman et al., 1998). The propensity score matching with difference in differences 
estimation method used in this study provides several advantages over previously used 
methods. This method tackles the selection issue by only drawing inference on 
comparable units. Off-support (non-comparable) units are excluded from the analysis. 
Regression-based approaches may suffer from bias because units that may have never 
benefited from the program even if they intended to participate are included. In addition, 
the differencing using individual level data renders this estimation method robust to 
individual time invariant unobservable factors that may be correlated with the decision of 
partaking in the program. Unobservable individual heterogeneity is a common source of 
bias in such studies due to the known endogenous nature of health insurance. Due to the 
imperfect targeting of Askeskin, several unobservable factors, such as taste for medical 
care or risk aversion, could lead to selection into the program. Unobservable factors 
cannot be accounted for and may have an important impact on the decision to select the 
program. The propensity score matching with difference in differences method is robust 
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to such factors as long as they do not vary with time. Lastly, due to its non-parametric 
nature, propensity score matching with difference in differences provides more flexible 
estimates than regression-based approaches as it does not impose a functional form on 
the relationship in question. 
Third, the dataset used in this study is very rich.  It allows us to reproduce and 
control for the attributes used in the eligibility process by the central and district 
governments. The Central Bureau of Statistics’ proxy means tested score and other 
criteria used in the eligibility process are used as explanatory variables in the computation 
of propensity score. Since the allocation of the program was based on the governments’ 
discretion and no formal application process was in place, the selection on observables 
assumption is reasonable in this study. Moreover, households were contacted by the 
districts independently and based on the lists provided by local governments. Households 
had little power to influence the allocation of the benefit and could hardly self-select into 
the program. Therefore, controlling for all the criteria used in this allocation may reduce 
bias greatly. In addition, the richness of the data allows me to control for an extensive set 
of controls at the individual, household and community level that have the potential to 
affect both the participation in the program as well as labor market outcomes.  
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Chapter Five: Empirical Strategy and Methodology 
 
5.1. Selection Bias  
5.1.1. Average Treatment Effect on the Treated and Selection Bias   
The aim of this dissertation is to estimate the impact of health insurance for the 
poor on labor market outcomes with negligible bias. Ideally, the most effective way to 
reach this goal is to simultaneously compare the outcome of the enrollee to what would 
be observed if they were not treated. However, this theoretical outcome cannot be 
observed. In order to circumvent this issue, empirical economists have compared the 
outcomes of recipients and non-recipients in order to estimate the impact of the program. 
If the benefit is distributed purely randomly, then an unbiased estimate of the program 
impact can be obtained by comparing these two groups.  However, if the benefit allocation 
fails the randomness condition, the estimate would suffer from selection bias and the 
“true” estimate would be difficult to discern from the effects of selection.  
To illustrate this, following Angrist and Pischke (2009), for each individual i, let the 
treatment variable be represented by the binary variable Ti= {0, 1}. Let Yi  represent the 
labor market outcome of interest.  For any individual i there are two potential outcomes 
possible: The outcome that would be observed if the individual participated in the program 
and the outcome in the counterfactual case.  As shown below: 
{
Y1i if Ti = 1
YOi if Ti = 0
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The issue is that, for any given individual, it is not possible to observe both 
outcomes at the same time because in a state of the world only one of the two can occur.  
Therefore, we will only be able to observe the outcome if the person was treated or not 
treated. 
We could write the observed outcomes in terms of potential outcomes with the 
below expression 
Yi = {
Y1i if Ti = 1
YOi if Ti = 0
 
= YOi + (Y1i − YOi)Ti 
The difference between the two outcomes above Y1i − YOi would be the causal 
effect on labor outcomes of the program. In practice, a portion of the population will be 
treated and the remaining will be untreated. Since the counterfactual is never observed 
for any given individual, we must compare the averages between treated and untreated 
individuals.  The average treatment effect between treated and untreated can be 
illustrated by the below relation: 
E [ Yi|Ti  =  1] −  E[Yi|Ti  =  0]=E [ Y1i|Ti  =  1] −  E[YOi|Ti  =  1] + E[YOi|Ti  =  1] −
E[YOi|Ti  =  0] 
This becomes, 
E[Y1i − YOi|Ti  =  1] + E[YOi|Ti  =  1] − E[YOi|Ti  =  0] 
The first term E[Y1i − YOi|Ti  =  1] represents the average treatment effect on the 
treated, namely, the average causal effect on the individuals that were treated. This would 
be what we would observe if we could simultaneously observe the outcome with treatment 
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and without treatment for the same individual. However, by comparing averages between 
two distinct individuals (one that benefited from the program and the other excluded from 
it), it will add a bias term if the assignment is not random. This selection bias is given 
E[YOi|Ti  =  1] − E[YOi|Ti  =  0]. It represents the inherent differences between treatment 
and control individual that cause them to select into the program. This term can be so 
large that it could conceal the true treatment effect.  Empirical economists’ goal is to find 
ways to overcome selection bias and estimate the average treated effect on the treated  
given above by E[Y1i − YOi|Ti  =  1]. 
Random assignment of the benefit (represented by Ti)  would fix this issue. In the 
benefit was randomly distributed, then the treatment variable would be exogenous: 
Yi ⫫ Ti 
In fact, if Ti is randomly assigned, it would be independent of the potential 
outcomes. Using our previous expression of the average treatment effect on the treated 
and the selection bias, Independence allows us to swap E[YOi|Ti  =  0] for E[YOi|Ti  =  1] 
E[Y1i − YOi|Ti  =  1] + E[YOi|Ti  =  1] − E[YOi|Ti  =  0]  
= E[Y1i − YOi|Ti  =  1] + E[YOi|Ti  =  1] − E[YOi|Ti  =  1]  
= E[Y1i − YOi|Ti  =  1] 
= E[Y1i − YOi] 
This last expression provides the average treatment on the treated and is an unbiased 
estimate of the impact of the program. 
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5.1.2. Selection Bias in Askeskin 
The allocation process of Askeskin may not be random and could suffer from 
selection bias for several potential reasons: 
5.1.2.1. Heterogeneity in the Targeting Criteria Used 
Though the many district governments used the proxy means tested score or a 
related set of variables, there were accounts of districts using other criteria. The eligibility 
process was decentralized and varied across communities. The benefit started to be 
provided several months before the proxy means tested score was effectively in place. 
As a result, district officials provided the benefit to recipients using a subset of the proxy-
means tested score variables present, criteria used for targeting of previous programs 
(such as the Health Card program25), or criteria at the discretion of the local governments. 
5.1.2.2. Lack of Compliance with Eligibility Rules in Certain Districts 
In fewer cases, certain districts and communities combined the official eligibility 
criteria and guidelines with informal targeting methods due to budget constraints. The 
rationale behind such methodology was to provide the benefit based on need since official 
criteria might be imprecise in perfectly identifying indigent and unhealthy individuals. 
Anecdotal evidence from Bachtiar et al. (2006) point out to occurrences in certain districts 
where local health centers and medical staff provided the benefit to the uncovered based 
on observable health status.  
 
 
                                                          
25 See footnote 18. 
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5.1.2.3. Organizational and Structural Issues 
Arifianto, Budiyati, Marianti, and Tan (20105) point to deficiencies in the 
implementation of Askeskin in its initial year. Targeting was implemented at the household 
level, and in eligible households, each member was eligible to be enrolled in the program. 
Nevertheless, due to costs associated with the obtaining the cards, poorer households 
may have decided to enroll only certain members.  Moreover, even though health services 
were completely free under Askeskin, transportation costs to points of health service, 
rendered health services costly for some households (Bachtiar et al., 2006). As a result, 
some indigent households only opted for partial coverage.  
Another reason for the potential presence of selection bias is related to the 
structure of the health care market in Indonesia. The quality of care in general differs 
between public and private providers but also between subsidized and out of pocket care. 
Subsidized care is generally viewed as lower quality as compared to the care received by 
patients paying out of pocket. In some poor areas, there were accounts of certain services 
in the Askeskin benefit package that failed to be delivered (Arifianto et al., 2005). This 
could have affected the decision to accept the benefit. 
Another organizational factor that could have influenced the indigent’s decision to 
partake in Askeskin is related to the awareness and information on the program. There 
were important deficiencies in the overall information campaign for Askeskin that led 
some beneficiaries and health care providers to be uninformed about the procedures and 
responsabilities related to the program (Bachtiar et al., 2006).  
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5.1.2.3. Other Reasons 
As is usually the case in developing countries, it would not be far-fetched to believe 
that some village leaders provided the benefit to their relatives and extended social 
network.  
All these factors would lead to selection bias and would require an estimation 
method that is robust to self-selection and potential confounding factors. The method 
used in this dissertation, propensity score matching with difference in differences is robust 
to time-invariant unobservable variables and provides estimates of the average treatment 
effect on the treated accurately if certain conditions are met.  In the next section, I will 
illustrate the identification strategy. 
5.2. Propensity Score Matching with Difference in Differences 
As mentioned above, I follow an empirical strategy similar to that used by Johar 
(2009) in studying the effectiveness of the Health Card program on the utilization of health 
care services. It is based on comparing the change in outcomes for individuals that 
received the program to the change in outcomes for members of a matched control group. 
This method was widely used in the impact evaluation of government programs on labor 
outcomes (Smith and Todd, 2000; Smith and Todd, 2005; Heckman et al., 1997; 
Heckman et al., 1998). It is a difference in differences estimator of the average treatment 
effect on the treated conditional on observable characteristics. They introduced an 
estimator that matches the changes in outcomes before and after treatment for recipients 
to the average of weighted changes of outcomes for controls units while conditioning on 
a set of characteristics that determine treatment (for instance, the proxy-means tested 
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score26). The differences are matched on the probability of treatment conditional on the 
propensity score and non-parametric weights are applied.  The longitudinal nature of the 
IFLS survey allows the use of this method as it requires a pre-program period and post-
program period.  
Let 𝑡 = 0 represent the pre-treatment period and 𝑡 = 1 represent the post-
treatment period. Let Yit
R denote the outcome for recipient individual i at time t and 
Yit
C represent the outcome without treatment for individual i at time t. Let R be an indicator 
variable for receiving treatment (R = 1 for treatment and R = 0 for lack thereof). Let X 
denote a set covariates used as conditioning variables. Finally, let P(X) = Pr (R = 1|X) be 
the propensity score of receiving treatment conditional on the set of characteristics of 
interest X. The key parameter of interest is the mean treatment effect on the treated 
conditional on a set of characteristics. 
θR=1(X) = E[Y1 − YO|X, R = 1] 
Certain assumptions are required for the method to return unbiased estimates.  
The next sections present the underlying assumptions. 
                                                          
26  If the proxy-means tested score were purely exogenous, an adequate estimation strategy would be to 
use the original scores computed by the BPS and search for a discontinuity at the threshold between the near 
poor and non-poor. Then, use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact on Askeskin near 
the threshold. This estimation method is not feasible in my case. Researchers do not have access to the original 
scores computed by the BPS used to assign the benefits to the poor. Since I am using a household survey to 
simulate the assignment variable, there might be some measurement error incorporated in it. I searched for a 
potential threshold in the simulated proxy means tested score from the IFLS survey at both the national level and 
each of the 225 districts included in the survey. I do not find a clear threshold neither at the national level nor at 
the district level.  
 
43 
 
5.2.1. Assumptions 
5.2.1.1. Assumption 1: Ignorability 
Yi1 − Yi0 ⫫ R𝑖|X 
Or the mean version, 
E[Yi1
C  − Yi0
C    |X, R = 1]  =  E[Yi1
C  − Yi0
C  | X, R =  0] 
This assumption is the usual ‘ignorability’ assumption, which states that, 
conditional on covariates X, the treatment can be considered as random (exogenous). In 
the case of propensity score matching with difference in differences, this assumption also 
tells us that the average outcomes for treated and controls would have followed similar 
paths without treatment.  This is a crucial identifying restriction in difference in differences 
models and also known as “Parallel Paths” assumption. Distribution of Askeskin may not 
be random; nevertheless, the allocation of the benefit is exogenous if X includes all of the 
variables that affect the allocation and are correlated to labor outcome. This assumption 
is reasonable in this case since the allocation of Askeskin was based on several 
observable variables that are contained in the survey and that are controlled for in this 
study. Moreover, since the allocation of the benefit was centralized at the national and 
district government level independently of households’ decision to enroll, it is sound to 
assume that controlling for eligibility characteristics should greatly reduce bias. They 
could hardly manipulate the assignment of the benefit27. Additionally, X must be 
exogenous to the treatment. 
                                                          
27 It is appropriate to assume that individuals had little power to manipulate the assignment of the program. 
Only after being selected, do they have the possibility to refuse the benefit. It is sound to assume that the 
large majority of individuals that were offered the benefit accepted it. 
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5.2.1.2. Assumption 2: Common Support 
For the ATT to be unbiased, at least fraction of the population must be treated. 
Moreover, since the identification is based on controlling for the effect of covariates 
included in X, some proportion of the control units must be untreated for the identification 
strategy to be valid. This allows us to find the appropriate “counterfactual” for each treated 
unit. The second assumption is called the “common support” assumption and is given by 
the below expression: 
0 < Pr(R = 1|X) < 1 
This common support assumption guarantees that the attributes of the treated and 
untreated units overlap sufficiently for appropriate matches to be found. Matching 
estimation does not infer relationships based on off support units. This is on amelioration 
over regression methods. This method avoids making inference from incomparable 
treated and control units, which would lead to biased average treatment on the treated 
estimates. Crump, Hotz, Imbens, and Mitnik (2009) claim that propensity score matching 
estimators should be bound to the regions of “thick” overlap. According to their research, 
this region is the efficient bound for semi-parametric and parametric estimators. They 
suggest that the range between 0.1 and 0.9 is optimal for several applications. Black and 
Smith (2004) examine a more restrictive interval of overlap. Units in the 0 to 0.1 area may 
be too dissimilar to infer proper relationship. Including them may bias the estimates. 
Therefore, due to sample restrictions from the Indonesian Family Life Survey, this study 
will use 0.1 to 0.9 as a common support.  
45 
 
5.2.2. Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
In the case of Askeskin, treatment effects need to be estimated by matching a 
large number of variables. This can render the estimation difficult. This is called the curse 
of dimensionality. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) developed a way of overcoming the 
curse of dimensionality by estimating a conditional probability of participating in the 
program, called the propensity score P(X), conditional on all the covariates X. They 
suggest selecting a propensity score based on attributes that determine treatment from 
the sample, then matching two individuals with this propensity score, one treated and one 
untreated.  This is a way of summarizing information given by X. the probability of 
participating in the program is estimated by a parametric procedure. In this study, the 
method used to obtain a propensity score is a probit regression. This allows the problem 
of matching to be reduced to a one-dimensional, nonparametric estimation problem 
instead of a multi-dimensional estimation problem. As mentioned before, the propensity 
scores require choosing a set X of that are not influenced by the program. The exogeneity 
of X is crucial to ensure unbiased estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated. 
In order to guarantee the exogeneity of X, pre-treatment characteristics should be used 
as conditioning variables (Johar, 2009; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). This would be both 
relevant even more relevant in the Askeskin program as it is even more reliant on 
observable characteristics. One useful result (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) is that the 
“ignorability” assumption still applies when using propensity scores. 
Yi1 − Yi0 ⫫ Ri|P(X) 
Alternatively, the mean version: 
E[Yi1
C  − Yi0
C    |P(X), R = 1]  =  E[Yi1
C  − Yi0
C  |P(X), R =  0] 
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For regular propensity score matching, the selection on observable or ignorability 
assumption is not robust to the selection due to time-invariant latent variables. The 
propensity score matching with difference in differences method allows for selection on 
time-invariant unobservables and hence is less restrictive than the cross-sectional version 
of propensity score matching. This is true because differencing nullifies the effect of time-
invariant characteristics that are unobservable. To the extent that treatment is determined 
by time-invariant characteristics, the propensity score matching with difference in 
differences matching technique will be robust to this type of bias by eliminating it. For 
instance, decision to seek coverage by Askeskin could be determined by the unobserved 
“taste” for medical care or risk aversion, which might not change much over time. Much 
of the appeal of the propensity score matching with difference in differences estimator 
lies in being able to cancel out those time-invariant characteristics correlated to the 
treatment and estimate the effect of the program based on comparable units. 
In order to calculate Average Treatment effects on the treated we rely on the mean 
conditional independence assumption above. The difference in differences version of the 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated is given by: 
ATT =  E[Yi1
R  − Yi0
R    |P(Xi), R = 1] −  E[Yi1
C  − Yi0
C  |P(Xi), R =  0] 
Given that the assumptions are not violated, the equation above provides an 
unbiased and consistent estimator of the average treatment effect on the treated. The 
next section describes the matching estimators used in estimating the impact of Askeskin 
on labor market outcomes. 
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5.2.3. Matching Estimators 
The propensity score algorithm searches for units that are closest in characteristics 
for matching appropriately. Let i denote a treated individual and R denote the set of 
treated individuals (i ∈ R). Let j denote a non-treated individual and C denote the set of 
non-treated individuals (j ∈ C). The sample equivalent for the average treatment effect on 
the treated can be written as : 
ATT = ∑  
i∈R
[(Yi1
R  − Yi0
R) − ∑  
j∈c
Wij(Yj1
C  − Yj0
C )] NR
−1 
The term Wij represents the weight assigned to a control unit j that is associated 
to a treated unit i. This expression effectively compares change in outcomes from 
recipient units to the weighted average of changes in outcomes of the control units. The 
weights reflect the propensity score of the unit in question and are determined by the 
specific matching method used (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). If the matching method 
utilizes only the most comparable unit based on propensity score, the weight will be equal 
to 1 for the closest unit and 0 for all other units. This matching algorithm is called the 
nearest neighbor matching method because it only uses the outcome of the most 
comparable unit j for each treated unit i.  However, there exists a more flexible estimator. 
This estimator is the kernel estimator and it uses the weighted average of the outcomes 
of all control units j, associating higher weights for control units with closer propensity 
score (i.e. more comparable units). Some hybrid methods of nearest neighbor matching 
and kernel matching exist. These utilize a weighted average of the outcomes of control 
individuals in a certain neighborhood of the propensity score of treated units. These 
methods are called caliper-matching methods. Kernel matching has the advantage that it 
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minimizes the standard errors and, hence, renders the estimator more efficient.  I will only 
present the kernel matching estimators. Gaussian weights are used.  
A closed form of the formula of the standard errors of the average treatment effect 
on the treatment estimates does not exist for kernel estimators. Therefore, I must rely on 
calculating the standard errors using the bootstrapping method with 400 repetitions for 
inference purposes. As mentioned above, only observations that lie in the region of 
common support from 0.1 to 0.9 are kept in the study. 
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Chapter Six: Data 
 
6.1. Description of the Indonesia Family Life Survey  
The estimation method requires a longitudinal dataset containing a pre-exposure 
period and a post–exposure period.  Since the inauguration of the program occurred in 
2005, the ideal survey should provide a wave before and a wave after 2005.  
The Indonesia Family Life Survey is an ongoing longitudinal household survey 
which started in 1993. It collects a very rich set of individual, household and community 
level socioeconomic and health data. It is a sample representative of 83% of the 
Indonesian population that is collected in 13 of the 27 provinces of the country (Strauss, 
Sikoki, Witoelar, and Watie, 2009). The data were gathered by the RAND Corporation in 
cooperation with American and Indonesian universities28. The sampling was stratified at 
the province level and then randomly sampled within provinces. This sampling was 
undertaken with the aim to maximize representation of the population and capture the 
cultural and socioeconomic diversity of the country. The first wave of the IFLS was 
conducted in 1993 (IFLS1), with a sample of 7224 households and data collected for 
22000 individuals in those households. There were three subsequent waves: in 1997 
(IFLS2), 2000 (IFLS3), and 2007(IFLS4). Each subsequent wave contains re-contacted 
IFLS1 households (the original households) and their split-offs (Strauss et al, 2009). A 
large proportion of the original individuals were re-contacted (around 95%). Due to 
                                                          
28 http://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS.html 
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households splitting off over time, the sample size for the 2000 survey increased to 10400 
households and is composed of 39000 individuals. In 2007, 13535 households are 
present containing 44,103 individuals.  
Main fieldwork went on from June through November 2000 for IFLS3 and between 
November 2007 and April 2008 for IFLS4 (Strauss, 2009), which constitutes a period of 
about 7 years between the pre-treatment period and post-treatment periods. Restricting 
to the sample of individuals that were present in the original survey (IFLS1), the sample 
is made up of 33,902. This is necessary for accurately addressing the issue of attrition.  
In addition, I restrict the sample to working-age individuals. Since the minimum legal age 
for labor participation is 15 and the age of retirement is approximately 65, I drop from this 
study all the individuals that are either younger than 15 years of age or older than 65 
years of age in both the pre and post surveys. 
Apart from its longitudinal nature, this dataset’s main appeal is its richness. It 
includes a comprehensive set of variables at the individual, household and community 
level. The ignorability assumption requires that all observable variables that may affect 
treatment and outcome be included in X for the ATT estimates to be unbiased. As 
mentioned previously, IFLS includes the majority of the variables officially used in the 
eligibility of recipients of the program (namely, the proxy means tested score). The rich 
nature of the data also allows controlling for a comprehensive set of complementary 
variables that may be correlated with the program allocation and labor market outcomes. 
The next section provides a description of the variables used in the analysis. 
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6.2. Dependent Variables  
6.2.1. Informal Status Variables 
No unanimously accepted characterization or measurement of informal status 
exists, even in higher income countries. In countries where social security appropriately 
covers the majority of the formal sector, the notion of informal sector employment is 
defined by the absence of social security coverage. In other places, informality would be 
more accurately identified based on the individuals’ employment status and occupation. 
The definition of informality is highly dependent on the country and institutions in place 
(OECD 2008).  
A survey by the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD,2008), argues that the best characterization of informality in Indonesia would be 
based on employment status and occupation of workers due to the fact that the social 
security mechanisms are under developed and many key benefits are either missing or 
limited (such as unemployment insurance and retirement benefits). Moreover, workers 
seldom enter in official agreements with their employers in Indonesia. Only a negligible 
fraction of the labor force has a written agreement with their employers. In 2007, 5% of 
active employers and employees report themselves as having their employment tied by 
a permanent contract. Whereas, 8% of the active labor force has any type of agreement 
(Newhouse et al., 2010). As mentioned earlier, enrollment in a formal social security 
scheme is far from widespread. Social security in the private sector (Jamsostek) is only 
mandatory in firms with 10 or more employees. In general, social insurance is much more 
common in larger private enterprises and the public sector and a large share of formal 
sector personnel is left out without social insurance. Based on the IFLS4, only about 55% 
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of private employees work in firms with 10 or more workers. Moreover, even in firms, that 
have 10 workers, the social security is not well enforced. As mentioned in section 2.2.2, 
there were serious compliance issues that led to some employers to fail to register certain 
employees for social security. Based on the IFLS survey only 20% of individuals in the 
formal sector have Jamsostek. This makes social security coverage or other legal 
protection such as legal agreements inaccurate measures of formal status. 
For the reasons above, I primarily use employment status as a definition of informal 
status. The Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics’ (BPS) official definition of informal 
status is based on the primary working status. Table 4 provides a simple description of 
how informality is defined officially in Indonesia.  
The Central Bureau of Statistics (Winarsih and Lisna, 2015) distinguishes between 
formal and informal self-employment. Self-employed with permanent workers are 
deemed to be part of formal sector whereas self-employed with temporary, family or 
unpaid workers are considered a part of the informal sector. All casual workers in 
agriculture or non-agriculture are considered informal. Likewise, own account workers 
and family workers are considered informal. Finally, the Central Bureau of Statistics 
considers all employees within the salaried sector to be a part of formal employment – 
including employees of small and medium enterprises, large firms and the entire public 
sector. 
The IFLS provides the employment status of the individual. I define informal status 
as a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if the individual is self-employed with 
no employees, self-employed with unpaid family members or temporary members, an 
unpaid family worker, or a casual worker. The informal status variable takes a value of 0 
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if the individual is a private worker, a government worker or self-employed with permanent 
workers. 
6.2.2. Labor Supply Variables 
I investigate both the intensive and extensive margins of labor supply. To measure 
the decision to work at the extensive margin, I use two variables. The first one takes a 
value of 1 if the individual was employed for pay in the week preceding the survey and 0 
otherwise. The second variable that takes a value of 1 if the person was employed for 
pay in the year preceding the survey and 0 otherwise.  
To measure the decision to work at the intensive margin, I use the hours worked 
in the week preceding the survey in the primary job of the respondent. I also include the 
typical number of weeks worked per year in the primary employment of the respondent. 
These variables are based on an estimate provided by the respondent. 
6.3. Explanatory Variables 
The independent variable of interest is a dichotomous variable for whether the 
household in which the individual lived received the Askeskin program. The variable takes 
a value of one for Individuals that received Askeskin (treatment group) and zero for non-
recipients (control group).  
In order to ensure the strict exogeneity of the control variables with respect to 
treatment, only pre-treatment values are used (i.e. as of 2000) in the estimation of the 
propensity score. The pre-treatment values are recorded four years before the 
implementation of the program which renders the exogeneity assumption reasonable, as 
the lag is long before the implementation of the program. The appropriate variables to 
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include as covariates are all the variables that are correlated with both the dependent 
variable (labor market outcome) and the treatment variable. In fact, in order to minimize 
the likelihood of a bias due to omitted variables, all variables that meet this condition need 
to be accounted for. Socioeconomic status, welfare status, demographic conditions, 
measures of well-being and infrastructure conditions are the main categories of 
covariates that are susceptible to determine both eligibility in the program and labor 
market outcomes.  
6.3.1. Individual Level Control Variables 
The control variables at the individual level include a dummy for gender, age, a 
dummy for marital status, four dummy variables for highest education level education 
completed (elementary education, junior high school, senior high school, and higher 
education). The inclusion of the personal and socio-economic characteristics is important 
as they are essential in predicting not only need and propensity to enroll in the program 
but also the labor status of individuals. 
Bachtiar et al. (2011) point to anecdotal evidence that Askeskin has been 
allocated, in some cases, based on health status. There are reasons to believe that if 
there was some degree of freedom in determining eligibility at the village level, then health 
should be considered as it should be an important factor, and thus it needs to be 
controlled for. Therefore, I added a variable measuring health of the individual in the 
analysis. It is a measure of self-reported general health status that takes values from 1 to 
4 depending on whether the person’s health is very healthy, somewhat healthy, 
somewhat unhealthy, and unhealthy respectively. 
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I also control for dichotomous variables signaling the enrollment of the individual 
to the other main types of health insurance programs:  the public sector program (Askes) 
and the private sector program (Jamsostek). Keeping individuals with other health 
insurance programs than Askeskin in the sample while controlling for their enrollment in 
those programs allows to maximize the sample used in the study. Dropping them from 
the sample would significantly reduce the sample size of the study.  
6.3.2. Household Level Control Variables 
The household-level variables included in the study are: household size, the age 
of the head of the household, a dummy variable for whether the head of the household is 
a female, and the number of children aged less than 12 in the household.  Household 
composition is correlated with the availability of health insurance in households as well 
as labor market decisions within the household.  Individuals that live in larger households 
and with children may be more prone to self-select into health insurance as they expect 
larger health care expenses. Individuals with older head of household will also be more 
likely to seek health insurance coverage as they expect large medical expenditures. 
The proxy means tested score was also computed at the household level. To 
construct the simulated proxy-means tested score, I use the original district – level 
weights provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics (225 different sets of weights for each 
districts in my sample). The Indonesian Family Life Survey includes all of the variables29 
that were used in the production of the proxy means tested score. The index values 
ranges from zero to 100, 0 corresponding to the richest individuals and 100 the poorest 
                                                          
29 Or closely related proxy variables. 
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individuals. The simulated proxy-means tested score does not perfectly predict the 
eligibility for several reasons. First, the eligibility rule was not strictly enforced for reasons 
discussed in Section 5.1.2. Second, proxy means testing can lead to some targeting 
errors, where some non-poor receive the benefit (inclusion error), and some poor do not 
(exclusion error). This is because the indicators used in the score might not be measured 
perfectly and fail to capture all the variation between the poor and the non-poor. In 
addition, the variables used to construct the proxy means tested score may not predict 
poverty perfectly. Third, using a household survey with several years of lag might add 
some measurement error.  
In my analysis of the Askeskin program, I control for the enrollment Health Card 
program that was implemented prior to the institution of Askeskin. This allows 
disentangling the potential effects of the Health Card program. Thus, I create a 
dichotomous variable that takes a value of one if the person lived in a household that 
received the Health Card and zero otherwise. Controlling for it is necessary since 
Individuals that obtained the Health Card are more likely to be enrolled in Askeskin. 
I control for the unconditional cash transfer program (BLT) for which enactment 
coincided with Askeskin. The unconditional cash transfer was another safety net program 
designed to reduce poverty and help indigent families financially.  As mentioned before, 
this program started in January 2005, ran for 12 months (from 2005 to 2006) and provided 
10$ a month to 19 million poor and near poor households (a total of $120). It has been 
documented that poverty alleviation programs that provide households with monetary 
transfers might affect labor market outcomes (Dabalen et al., 2007), therefore controlling 
for it would account for changes in labor market outcomes related to its implementation.  
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If this program has a large enough impact on labor supply or informality, omitting to control 
for this variable may lead to bias as the labor impact observed and associated with this 
program would coincide with the introduction of Askeskin and may be mistakenly 
attributed to Askeskin. 
6.3.3. Community Level Control Variables 
I add several controls to account for community level characteristics. There are 
large disparities between rural and urban areas in Indonesia. In fact, even within urban 
areas and rural areas, communities may differ substantially. These characteristics might 
have an effect on both the likelihood of employment and the propensity of receiving 
Askeskin.  The economy and the labor market are in general more dynamic in urban areas 
and jobs are easier to find. Moreover, the population in rural areas is likely to be low 
skilled and less educated. The supply of health services is lower in rural areas as there 
less health care facilities and professionals and access is more difficult. Infrastructure are 
more rudimentary in rural areas and the quality of health services lower. These factors 
would render the enrollment in Askeskin relatively less desirable. As a result, not 
accounting for this spatial heterogeneity might lead to omitted variable bias and 
endogeneity of my coefficient of interest. Adding infrastructure and supply of health care 
variables at the community level as controls should capture most of the community-level 
differences in propensity to receive targeting as well as differences in labor market 
decisions. 
I include a dichotomous variable indicating whether the individual lives in an urban 
or rural community, a dichotomous variable for the presence of an asphalt road in the 
village, the percentage of households that have electricity in the community, the presence 
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of a sewage system in the community and the presence of piped water in the community. 
These variables should account for the infrastructural differences between communities. 
Areas with better infrastructure should have better access to health care service due to 
better transportation routes. This would render the benefit more desirable. Additionally, I 
include the number of health centers present in the town and an indicator for the presence 
of a midwife30. The larger the quantity of health providers and the better the quality of 
health care provided, the more valuable the benefit to potential recipients. I also include 
a variable at the community’s subjective wealth. Considering the current conditions of the 
village population, this variable asks a village official to rank their village on a scale from 
one to six, one corresponding to the village where the population is poorest, and six 
representing the village where the population is richest. 
Finally, since there is a large spatial disparity in the distribution of the population 
and important socioeconomic heterogeneity across provinces, I include dummies for all 
provinces where the survey has taken place. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 A midwife is a person that is trained to assist women in childbirth. Due to high maternal and child mortality, 
maternal care has been a priority for the government for decades. In 1989, the government implemented a 
program in which midwives were placed in birth facilities in most villages across the country. Due to low 
access to care in remote areas, the midwife sometimes provides basic health care when a physician is not 
present. 
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Chapter Seven: Preliminary Regressions 
 
 
This section provides preliminary regression results using different methodologies 
both cross-sectional and longitudinal. The purpose of this exercise is expositional in 
nature. Chapter 8 provides the main (“preferred”) results of this dissertation based on the 
propensity score matching with difference in differences discussed in earlier sections. 
Tables 5 to 10 present cross sectional regression (with and without controls), fixed effects 
and propensity score matching estimates. The propensity score estimates only use the 
2007 values for the dependent variables and the pre-treatment values for the independent 
variables.  The regressions are estimated using OLS (i.e. linear probability model for 
binary dependent variables). The propensity score matching estimates use the kernel 
matching method. The results are presented for the full sample, for subsamples by gender 
and by residence status (urban vs. rural) in order to investigate potential heterogeneous 
impacts. In fact, as commonly known, labor markets are seen as heterogeneous and 
segmented in developing countries since the labor market conditions faced by different 
groups (men vs. women, urban vs. rural, skilled vs. unskilled) may be different. Fields 
(2011) argues that the overall labor market in developing countries is a network of 
interconnected labor market segments that are connected by the potential mobility of 
firms and workers. The segments that make up the labor market differ from one another 
by the level of income and benefits and the employment arrangements. Labor mobility 
between the better segments (usually formal) and the less desirable segments is 
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assumed to be limited (i.e. informal). In these less desirable segments, underemployed 
is ubiquitous. Certain groups within these segments are less privileged than others.  In 
fact, women are usually disadvantaged in developing countries’ labor markets; they 
usually earn less, work more often in the informal market and are more likely to hold 
irregular positions. There are also spatial differences in labor markets. The nature of the 
industries available in the rural areas is more rudimentary. Individuals are more likely to 
be engaged in agricultural activities. In addition, informality is more prevalent in the rural 
world. The urban world is characterized by greater wage labor and greater formal 
employment. Therefore, it is important to investigate the impact on different samples.  
7.1. Cross-sectional OLS Estimation 
If the treatment were purely random, a simple cross sectional regression 
framework would return unbiased results. As mentioned above, random assignment 
would only necessitate comparing the means between treated individuals and untreated 
individuals. I estimate an OLS specification without controls first and then using a full set 
of controls31. I use the 2007 values of the variables controlled for and use robust standard 
errors for estimation. The model estimated is the below: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑖𝛿 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖 
Where 𝛿 is the coefficient of interest, 𝑋𝑖 is a set of explanatory covariates and 𝑌𝑖  the 
labor market variable of interest. 
 
                                                          
31 Linear probability model in the case of binary dependent variables. 
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7.1.1. Full Sample 
As shown in table 5, the relationship between receipt of Askeskin and informality 
when no controls are added appears to be strong and positive; however, it changes signs 
and is still significant at the 10% level when a full set of control variables is added to the 
model.  The counter-intuitive negative sign in the regression equation for informality can 
be explained by the fact that OLS can only provide a partial picture since it cannot account 
for bias caused by unobservable variables. Therefore, a method that is robust to 
unobservable confounders would provide better indication on the true nature of this 
relationship. Later, when applying the more robust propensity score matching methods, 
this significant negative impact disappears as expected. Concerning labor supply at the 
extensive margin, there appears to be a marginally significant negative relationship for 
the probability of working in the previous week when no controls are added, but no 
significant effect with a full set of controls. For the number of hours worked per week, we 
observe a strong negative relationship without controls. The relationship stays significant 
at the 10% level when a full set of controls is added to the equation.  It appears that 
receiving Askeskin led to a decrease of 1.1 hours worked per week. There is a strong 
relationship (1% level) for the weeks worked per year without controls. When controls are 
added, it stays significant at the 5% level. Individuals appear to be working 0.78 weeks 
less per year due to Askeskin.  
7.1.2. By Gender 
As shown in Table 7, there is a strong positive relationship (significant at the 1% 
level) on informality for women when no controls are added, however, there is no 
significant relationship apparent when a full set of controls are added. Concerning labor 
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supply at the extensive margin, the relationship is not significant for any of the 
specifications whether with controls or not. However, the signs are negative as expected.  
The regression equation on the intensive margin of labor supply provide significant and 
negative (1% level) estimates when no controls are included and no significance when 
controls are added. However, they exhibit the expected sign (i.e. negative). 
As shown on Table 6, the specification with informal status as a dependent 
variable exhibits a strong positive relationship for the sample of men when no controls 
are used. Yet, the relationship becomes negative but still significant (5% level) when a 
full set of controls is added. Similarly, to the effect observed for the full sample, this 
change in sign could be caused by confounding factors.  The estimates on labor supply 
at the extensive margin are insignificant with and without controls and the magnitude is 
very close to zero. This is may be an indication that men do not change their labor force 
participation because of their enrollment in Askeskin. Regarding labor supply at the 
intensive margin, only the specifications without controls return very significant (1% level) 
and negative estimates. However, the signs for the estimates for both the regression 
equations on hours worked per week and weeks worked per year have negatives sign as 
expected. 
7.1.3. By Residence Status 
Using the sample of individuals living in urban areas, Table 8 shows that the 
specification with informality as a dependent variable and without controls returns very 
significant positive estimates. They are large in magnitude (9% increase), which indicates 
that the effects associated to other variables are entangled in this estimate. However, 
when control variables are added, the estimates become insignificant and change signs.  
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The specification with labor supply at the extensive margin as a dependent variable 
returns insignificant results with and without controls for the probability of working in the 
preceding year, whereas only the specification without controls appear to be marginally 
significant for the probability of working in the preceding week. The signs are negative in 
all cases. Regarding labor supply at the intensive margin, individuals living in urban areas 
appear to work 4.51 hours less when no controls are used (very significant at the 1% 
level) and the estimates decrease to a negative 1.66 hours per week when we use a full 
set of controls (marginally significant at the 10% level). For weeks worked per year only 
the estimate without control is significant (at the 1% level), the estimates become smaller 
and non-significant when a full set of controls are added. For labor supply at the intensive 
margin, the estimates are also all in the expected direction. 
For rural areas, the coefficient on informality is large, positive, and significant 
without controls and becomes smaller, negative and insignificant when we account for all 
control variables.  Concerning labor supply at the extensive margin, the coefficient on the 
probability of working in the week preceding the survey is marginally significant without 
controls but becomes insignificant when controls are added. The specification with 
working in the preceding year as a dependent variable is insignificant in both cases. 
Concerning labor supply at the intensive margin, OLS estimates without controls are very 
significant for both hours per week and weeks per year and only stay significant with 
controls for weeks per year. It appears that individuals in rural areas decrease their labor 
supply by 1.27 weeks per year due to the availability of Askeskin.  
Overall, the signs of the variables are as expected for the labor supply (negative). 
In a few cases, the informal status specifications return significant and counterintuitive 
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signs (full sample and sample of men).  A robust estimation technique is necessary in 
order to uncover the true relationship and eliminate different sources of bias.  Overall, 
when controlling for a full set of controls most specifications return insignificant estimates. 
This is probably due to omitted variable bias due to unobservables, which may bias the 
standard errors upwards and consequently bias the t-ratios downwards. Consequently, it 
is less likely to reject the null hypothesis when it is false. Moreover, the OLS method is 
based on strong assumptions. It is inappropriate because it infers relationships from 
incomparable units. It includes a large number of control units that would not have never 
received the program even if they intended to and individuals that received the program 
that should not have received it since they do not have the appropriate profile. In the next 
section, Propensity score matching estimates are presented. This method provides an 
enhancement over regular OLS, as it compares observations that are similar. 
7.2. Propensity Score Matching 
Table 10 presents the results for the propensity score-matching model. The 
Propensity score matching estimates provide two enhancements over the regular OLS 
regression estimation. As mentioned above, it does not compare individuals that are not 
comparable (outside of the common support) and it uses non-parametric estimation that 
does not assume any functional relationship between dependent and independent 
variables. Misspecified functional form can lead to bias and would invalidate the 
regression estimates. Hence, using a method that does not impose functional restrictions 
on the regression model can enhance the estimates. In order to estimate the cross-
sectional PSM model, I use as controls the baseline dataset variables (2000 values) in 
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order to ensure the exogeneity of the treatment variable with respect to the explanatory 
variables.  
7.2.1. Full Sample 
For the full sample, the specifications of the informality and labor supply at the 
extensive margin return insignificant estimates. The estimates for labor supply at the 
extensive margin are both in the correct direction but insignificant (though the probability 
of working in the preceding week is only marginally insignificant). Concerning labor supply 
at the intensive margin, both the hours worked per week and the weeks worked per year 
provide estimates in the expected direction (negative). They are significant at the 1% level 
and 5% level respectively.  
7.2.2. By Gender 
Looking at the sample by gender, the specification with informality as a dependent 
variable returns insignificant negative estimates for both men and women. Regarding 
labor supply at extensive margin, only the probability of working in the previous week 
provides significant estimates for both men and women. These estimates are marginally 
significant (at the 10% level). Being enrolled in Askeskin leads to a decrease in the 
probability of working in the previous week of 2.7 percentage points for both men and 
women. Being enrolled in Askeskin also appears to lead to a decrease in the numbers of 
hours worked and weeks worked for women of 1.82 hours a week and 1.25 weeks per 
year. These estimates are significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively. For men, only 
the specification with hours worked per week as a dependent variable returns significant 
results (at 5% level). Being enrolled in Askeskin appears to lead to a decrease in the 
numbers of hours worked for men of 1.246 hours per week.  
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7.2.3. By Residence Status 
There appears to be no evidence of an effect of Askeskin on either informality or 
labor supply at extensive margin for neither urban nor rural areas as the coefficient are 
non-significant. Concerning the labor supply at the intensive margin, only the hours 
worked show a significant effect (at the 1% level) for urban areas. It appears that receiving 
Askeskin leads to a decrease of 2.691 hours per week. For individuals living in rural areas, 
only the specification with weeks worked as a dependent variable shows a significant 
effect (at the 1% level). Receiving Askeskin leads to a decrease in the weeks worked per 
year of 1.353 based on this model. 
The propensity score matching estimates are suggestive that an effect exists on 
labor force participation and quantity of work. This impact seems to be present for both 
men and women. If unobservable variables are correlated to both the treatment variable 
and dependent variables, the results returned by OLS regressions and PSM in a cross-
sectional setting could be unreliable due endogeneity, mainly due to the selection bias 
arising from unobservable variables (omitted variable bias). Therefore, one must be 
careful in interpreting these estimates as causal estimates. For cross-sectional data, the 
usual solution for this problem is the use of an instrument as a remedy to the selection 
issue (or a regression discontinuity framework). However, in the case of Indonesia, the 
lack of strong instruments and the presence of longitudinal data renders panel data 
models preferable. Methods using panel data are robust to time invariant unobservable 
and are more effective in correcting the main cause of selection bias. The next section 
presents the fixed effects estimates using a baseline survey before the introduction of the 
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program. This method is more compelling as it accounts for time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
7.3. Fixed Effects Estimation 
Given the longitudinal nature of the data, I can implement a fixed-effect estimation 
strategy. The main advantage of this strategy is that it is robust to the time invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity across individuals. The fixed effect equation is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝛿 +  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 +  𝑢𝑖 +  𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
For individual i and period t=1,2.  is our dependent variables of interest (labor 
market outcomes in our case).  is a set of individual, household and community level 
controls. 𝑢𝑖  represents the group fixed-effects which controls for unobservable differences 
between groups.  𝑣𝑡 are time fixed effects which provides the impacts common to all 
groups but is variable across time. Finally, embodies the idiosyncratic error.  The panel 
is strongly balanced. 
7.3.1. Full Sample 
Table 5 provides the fixed effects estimates for the full sample. For the 
specification with informality as a dependent variable, the fixed effects estimates are close 
to marginally significant (but not significant) and exhibit the expected (positive) sign, this 
result (compared to OLS estimates) can be explained by the reduction of bias due to 
unobservables. For instance, if risk aversion to health events is the confounding factor, 
and more risk averse individuals are more likely to work in the formal sector and more 
prone to self-select into Askeskin then not accounting for this unobservable factor (risk 
aversion) could attenuate the coefficient. If the effect is large enough it could lead to a 
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negative effect on informality. This was observed in the cross-sectional estimation case.  
As a result, cancelling out the effect of the confounders by differencing using fixed effects 
estimation leads to positive coefficients.  
Regarding labor supply at both the extensive margin and intensive margins, the 
coefficients are all insignificant but in the correct direction (negative). 
7.3.2. By Gender and by Residence Status 
By segmenting the data by gender and region, it appears that there is not any 
significant effect for any of the dependent variables.  
Similarly to cross sectional OLS, the issue with fixed-effects estimation is that it 
includes a large number of observations with low propensity score (p<0.1). These off-
common support observations can bias the estimates. In fact, several individuals with low 
propensity score that did not receive the program cannot be used as control units as they 
would not have received the program even if they intended to. These individuals are too 
far off the eligibility threshold and should not be used as controls. Similarly, low propensity 
score treated units should not have received the benefit in the first place and are not valid 
observations for inference purposes. Fixed effects estimation imposes a linear 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. If the true relationship is 
not linear, fixed effects regression would lead to biased estimates. The standard errors 
would also be larger, rendering the t-ratios too small to be significant. 
An estimation method that can correct these issues is the propensity score 
matching with difference in differences as it allows to only compare individuals that are 
comparable (by restricting the common support), does not impose a functional form and 
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is robust to time invariant unobservable variables. This method provides an enhancement 
over the regular cross-sectional propensity score matching as its difference in differences 
nature renders it robust to unobserved heterogeneity. It also improves the fixed-effects 
estimates by only drawing inference from comparable units. The next section presents 
the results from the propensity score matching with difference in differences estimation 
method.  
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Chapter Eight: Propensity Score Matching with Difference in Differences 
 
 
8.1. Testing Assumptions 
8.1.1. Ignorability of Treatment Assumption 
A crucial identifying restriction in the propensity score matching with difference in 
differences model states that, conditional on explanatory variables, the assignment of 
treatment becomes random or that the average outcomes for treated and controls would 
have followed similar paths in absence of the treatment. This is an important assumption 
since it helps disentangle the effect of the program from trends that would lead the 
outcome variable to follow a certain path regardless of the effect of the treatment variable. 
The IFLS provides an opportunity to test for this assumption as it contains a wave right 
before the baseline survey. The strategy used to test for the validity of the ignorability 
assumption is to examine whether an effect is present using the survey prior to the 
baseline survey (1997) and the baseline survey (2000). If the effects observed in our main 
analysis are only due to trends in the outcome variables, I should observe such effect 
between 1997 and 2000. Using the sample of individuals that were treated in 2005 and a 
similar control group, I test whether there is an effect using the same estimation strategy 
(propensity score matching with difference in differences). Table 11 shows that none of 
the coefficients are significant for any of the subsamples and dependent variables. This 
provides a reasonable indication that the ignorability assumption is valid. Therefore, it is 
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safe to claim that the effects observed in the subsequent sections are not due to a trend 
in the dependent variables that are not related to the enrollment in Askeskin. 
8.1.2. Common Support Assumption 
The treatment and control groups need to overlap and thus, share a region of 
common support on the propensity score.  However, for my estimates to be accurate only 
individuals that have a high enough probability of receiving the treatment need to be 
included as comparisons. In fact, observations with low levels of P(x) could bias the 
estimates. Estimation of average treatment effects is often undermined by lack of 
overlapping of the covariate distributions. In propensity score matching, the choice of the 
control units is the key determinant in obtaining sound estimates. Using control 
observations that have low propensity score can render the estimates invalid since they 
are not comparable and would most likely not be able to enroll in the program even if they 
desired to. Recently, Crump et al. (2009) proposed a systematic ad hoc approach that 
addresses the problem of lack of overlap. They showed that for a wide range of 
distributions, an appropriate ad hoc method is to remove all units with estimated 
propensity scores that are not in the interval [0.1, 0.9]. This provides a good approximation 
to the optimal rule. This is also referred as “trimming” the common support. Therefore, in 
this study, the sample is limited to observations propensity score equal to at least 0.1 but 
no more than 0.9. This ensures that every treated observation have at least one 
comparable untreated observation in the sample.  
Figures 2 and 3 present the kernel density graph of the estimated propensity score 
of both the treated and non-treated groups. Before applying the ad-hoc rule restricting the 
common support from 0.1 to 0.9, a large number of observations are located in the 0 to 
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0.1 area. Those are mainly control observations; however, some treated observations are 
also contained in that area. These observations can cause biased estimates and should 
be excluded from the analysis. After restricting the sample to the [0.1, 0.9] area, 3380 
observations are excluded, 3154 untreated and 226 treated. Figure 3 shows that there is 
significant overlap between treated and untreated observations. The common support 
area for the propensity scores is [0.1, 0.785], hence, the upper bound does not require to 
restrict the sample as there are no observations with P(x)>0.785. 
8.1.3. Balancing Property 
One important condition for the propensity score matching method to return 
unbiased results is that, given an equal propensity score, observations must have the 
same distribution of both observable and unobservable characteristics independently of 
treatment status. This is called the balancing condition. However, it is impossible to test 
for the balancing of unobservable characteristics. Therefore, I test the balancing condition 
of observable characteristics based on a method presented by Becker and Ichino (2002). 
This is based on the pscore command in Stata. The test consists in splitting the sample 
into several intervals called “blocks” for which the average propensity score is equal. Then 
the program statistically tests (using a two-sample t-test) that the mean value between 
treated and control units do not differ for each covariate in each block. The balancing 
property is not rejected only in the case that it holds for all the covariates. In this study, 
the balancing property is satisfied32. 
                                                          
32 Due to the large number of t-tests related to this method, the results are not presented. 
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8.1.4. Testing for Attrition 
Panel surveys have traditionally suffered from sample attrition. If attrition is non-
random and severe enough, it can render the sample non-representative and could 
invalidate the estimates. The reason for this is that respondents that drop out of the 
longitudinal survey may differ systematically from individuals that are re-interviewed. 
Therefore, results of studies that only incorporate continuing panel respondents may 
suffer from severe attrition bias. The problem of attrition is especially widespread in 
household surveys conducted in developing countries due to communication means 
being underdeveloped. It is not easy to track individuals that have moved from one survey 
to another. Tracking movers can implicate substantial investment in terms of time and 
money. 
Using the first two waves of the Indonesia Family Life Survey, Thomas, Frankenberg 
and Smith (2001) showed that panels in developing countries are not all necessarily 
contaminated by high rates of attrition. Statistics from the IFLS show an optimistic picture. 
94% of the households interviewed in 1993 were re-interviewed in 1997. This rate of re-
contact tops even the best surveys in the United States.  
Since the study uses the last two waves of the IFLS, I test for the presence attrition 
between the third wave (baseline) and fourth wave (post-treatment) of IFLS. I first 
examine descriptive statistics by comparing the group of attritors and non-attritors across 
multiple variables measured at the baseline. Then, I estimate a binary dependent variable 
model of attrition as a function of variables measured at the baseline in order to examine 
whether differences between attritors and non-attritors hold after controlling for a 
comprehensive set of socio-demographic characteristics. The model used includes 
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demographic characteristics, health characteristics, labor force variables, household 
composition and resource variables, as well as spatial and community characteristics in 
2000. 
Based on the IFLS, 93.46% of individuals in the 2000 data are successfully re-
interviewed in the 2007 wave. Therefore, the attrition rate between these two surveys is 
6.54%, which is similar to the 94% that Thomas et al. (2001) estimates using the first and 
second wave. Table 12 presents the comparison of descriptive statistics and t-test 
between the group of attritors and group of non-attritors. It appears that for most variables 
the group of attritors are significantly different. The individual demographic characteristics 
point out to the fact that older married individuals with higher education level are more 
likely to be attritors. There is no clear difference in health status. The labor force 
participation variables indicate that attritors are more likely to work and work more hours 
and less likely to work in the informal sector. Household composition and resource 
variables appear to indicate that attritors are wealthier (very significant difference in proxy 
means tested score), live in smaller households, and have less children. Community 
characteristics appear to show that individuals that are attritors live in areas that are 
wealthier and have better overall infrastructure. Attritors are also more likely to live in 
urban areas. However, these results are only indicative at best, as they only provide a 
comparison of means individually. It is important to control for all other variables that may 
cause attrition. 
Table 13 provides estimates of a binary dependent variable model of attrition as a 
function of variables measured at the baseline wave. After estimating a full model, it 
appears that some differences remain between the group of attritors and non-attritors. 
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Age, proxy-means tested score, hours worked per week and number of health centers 
show significant differences that are small in magnitude. Attritors are more likely to be 
married, more likely to have higher education, are less likely to have children, are less 
likely to work in the informal sector, are more likely to have piped water and are more 
likely to live in an urban area. However, the magnitude of these variables is small. 
The presence of attrition (even though small) can bias our estimates. Thus, it is 
necessary to apply a method to correct the sample from attrition bias. IFLS provides 
sampling weights that allow to account for attrition in the survey. Strauss, Sikoki, Witoelar, 
and Watie (2009) describe the procedure in order to correct the attrition bias specific to 
the IFLS Survey. They compute weights specific to each survey to be used by researchers 
in order to obtain a representative sample. The inverse probability weights provided in the 
Indonesia Family Life Survey dataset correct for both sampling bias as well as attrition 
bias. The methodology to compute the longitudinal analysis individual weights is the 
following:  In order to correct for in between-survey attrition, they first estimated a logistic 
model of the probability that an individual found in a baseline wave of IFLS was found in 
a subsequent wave, conditional on basic individual and household characteristics at the 
baseline. They then calculated the predicted probability that the individual was found. 
From that predicted probability, they computed the inverse-probability-of-attrition weights 
for each individual. I use the weights provided in the IFLS in order adjust for attrition. 
Conditional on these weights, attrition can be considered as ignorable and random. 
Finally, because all respondents who were interviewed in the later waves but were 
not in the original household roster (IFLS1) are not assigned longitudinal weights, it is 
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necessary to restrict the analysis to only the individuals that were present in the original 
survey (1993). 
8.2. Descriptive Statistics 
8.2.1. Explanatory Variables 
For comparison purposes, Table 14 presents descriptive statistics for the full 
sample and by treatment status without restricting the area of common support (trimming) 
as described in section 8.1.2. Table 15 presents the descriptive statistics for the full 
sample and by treatment status after restricting the area of common support. As 
mentioned previously, the sample is restricted to the thick overlap area of [0.1, 0.785]. 
Restricting the sample has reduced the differences in characteristics between the treated 
and untreated. However, there are still significant differences in the distribution of 
characteristics between the treated and control groups. This is consistent with the fact 
that the program targets the poor and near-poor population. The treated individuals are 
materially poorer than the non-treated as indicated by their higher proxy-means tested 
score. Other socio-economic characteristics such as education show significant 
differences as well. The difference in socio-economic status is also true at the community 
level. Differences in statistical significance of infrastructure and subjective community 
well-being variables suggest that treated individuals come from poorer areas with less 
developed infrastructures. Overall, the statistical significance of the difference in the 
means of the socio-economic, infrastructure and household characteristics across these 
two groups suggests that the governments targeting strategy was appropriate and 
successful. A small portion of the individuals that received the benefit in 2005 was part of 
the formal sector social insurance program in the pre-treatment period. It is indicative that 
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certain individuals enrolled formerly in the formal sector insurance programs come from 
poor households. Working in the formal sector does not fully protect from economic 
shocks that could lead to vulnerability or poverty. In fact, a non-negligible portion of 
individuals working in the formal sector could easily fall into vulnerable status and become 
eligible for the program. Certain household could fall into poverty in between waves. 
Households could also decide to drop out of the formal sector and move to the informal 
sector even if they are not poor.  
Due to the overall difference in the distribution of characteristics between treated 
and untreated, employing a linear regression method or fixed effects would lead to biased 
estimates as the treated individuals are fundamentally different from untreated individuals 
in the sample. Propensity score matching would allow the balancing on these differences 
by only comparing observations that are similar in characteristics.  
8.2.2. Dependent Variables 
Tables 16.a to d display the descriptive statistics and t-test for the pre and post-
treatment labor market outcomes by treatment status before and after trimming the 
common support. Trimming reduces the significance of the differences of means between 
treated units and untreated units. However, the majority t-statistics stay significant even 
after restricting the area of common support.  
Table 16.d shows the post-treatment labor market outcomes means by treatment status 
after trimming. At first glance, a t-test of the differences in the means between recipients 
and non-recipients of Askeskin suggest that there is a significant difference in the means 
of post-treatment values for Informal status and Labor supply measured by the numbers 
of hours worked per week or weeks worked per year.  The means in the post-treatment 
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level of labor supply at the extensive margin do not exhibit any difference. Nevertheless, 
one must refrain from drawing inference from a tabulation or a test of means of post-
treatment dependent variables values. Post-treatment values do not take into account the 
initial level of the variable of interest.  As shown in Table 16.c, the difference in 
characteristics between treated and untreated individuals in the pre-treatment wave are 
considerable. In fact, treated individuals are actually less likely to work in the informal 
sector prior to implementation of the program. They are more likely to participate in the 
labor force as shown by the probability of working the preceding month and preceding 
year. They also work less hours per week and more weeks per year. All of these variables 
are significant. Both the direction and magnitude in the pre-treatment values for the 
dependent variable would invalidate drawing inference from the significant relationship at 
the cross-sectional level for post treatment outcomes.  The difference in differences 
method is useful in the sense that it takes into consideration the initial condition and allows 
to “net” these differences.  
Moreover, comparing post-treatment differences in means does not provide a full 
picture as it does not take into account fundamental differences in the two groups (treated 
and control). Therefore, not controlling for all potential confounding variables leads to 
completely biased estimates. In order to reach an unbiased estimate constructing a 
control group by computing a propensity score from a comprehensive set of 
characteristics is desirable. The next sections provide the results from propensity score 
matching with difference in differences.  
 
 
79 
 
8.3. Results 
8.3.1. Results of the Matching Equation 
Table 17 presents the results of the matching equation used to compute the 
propensity score. As mentioned earlier, the propensity score is computed by probit and 
the explanatory variables are measured using their pre-treatment values. As expected, 
most of the variables are statistically significant. Significance of covariates in the matching 
equation means that treated individuals are materially different from non-treated 
individuals. Hence, this reinforces the rationale behind the use of propensity score 
matching with difference in differences, as regression based methods would return biased 
results. Some variables at individual, household and community level return insignificant 
results. However, some of these variables such as age, gender and marital status are 
important determinant of labor market outcomes and there is no valid reason to remove 
them from the matching equation. In fact, it is known that unless there is a robust reason 
of excluding certain variables from the equation, it is preferable to keep them if their 
presence is sound based on previous empirical research or economic theory. 
Concerning individual level variables, education and the proxy means tested score 
are very significant (with a negative and positive coefficient respectively) which is 
expected since the program is supposed to target the poor.  Household composition as 
measured by household size has a positive significant coefficient since poorer 
households are usually larger due to a larger number of children but also the presence of 
the extended family. At the community level, the infrastructure variables are negative and 
significant which is in line with the fact that individuals living in poorer communities are 
more likely to be enrolled in Askeskin. Finally, the coefficient on previous programs is 
80 
 
positive and very significant since those programs are pro-poor and some households 
may to be enrolled in several programs. 
8.3.2. Informal Status 
Table 18 displays the impact of Askeskin on informal status by gender and by 
residence status. The propensity score matching with difference in differences estimates 
are insignificant across all samples but exhibit the correct sign in most cases (i.e. 
positive). Several explanations to this lack of an effect on informality are possible. 
The first potential reason is that Askeskin was not perceived to offer any benefit to 
the population and thus did not provide the necessary incentive to entice workers to move 
out of the formal sector. This reason is implausible, as research has shown that Askeskin 
decreased out-of-pocket expenditures between 11% to 34% (Aji et al., 2013) and 
provided value to beneficiaries by covering them against risk associated with illness.   In 
fact, as shown Table 1, the package provided by Askeskin is at least as good as the other 
insurance programs available and free of charge. 
The second explanation could be that since Askeskin does not prevent individuals 
from working in the formal sector, poorer households working in the formal sector could 
have been selected for coverage. Therefore, individuals could have kept their formal 
sector jobs while enrolling in Askeskin. In IFLS, out of all individuals that are in the labor 
force, 29% work in the formal sector. Therefore, it is possible that no effect is present 
because individuals can keep their perceivably more valuable formal sector job and 
receive the benefit. However, this reason is also implausible as the vast majority of 
individuals enrolled in Askeskin work in the informal sector based on the definition of 
Central Bureau of Statistics. Based on the IFLS, a simple tabulation of the enrollment in 
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Askeskin versus the informal status shows that only 30% of the recipients work in the 
formal sector whereas 70% of the recipient work in the informal sector. This large 
proportion of informality for Askeskin recipients may also be reason for the absence of 
evidence of an effect in informality. In fact, since the original proportion of recipient 
individuals working in the informal sector is high, it is less likely to find an effect at the 
margin. 
A third possibility is that individuals are not willing to move or stay in the informal 
sector because informal sector jobs are less desirable.  Formal sector jobs are more 
prized by workers and, hence, workers are reluctant to abandon them. This absence of 
an effect across all samples could be due to the presence of segmented labor markets in 
Indonesia. Harris and Todaro (1970) posited that in developing countries, individuals are 
queuing to enter formal sector jobs and when these jobs are attained, it is very unlikely 
that individuals would move towards informal sector jobs. Individuals in the informal sector 
would prefer formal to informal jobs under most circumstances. In the Indonesian context, 
many workers are trapped in informality, as they cannot get jobs in the formal sector. 
Therefore, the initially large proportion of informal sector workers and lack of mobility 
towards the formal sector could be also be a reason for the lack of significant evidence 
on informality. Since most individual’s value formal sector jobs more than informal sector 
jobs, they would require a large compensation in order to move from formal to informal. 
Thus, implicit incentives such as Askeskin might not be enough to have an impact on 
informal status. 
82 
 
8.3.3. Labor Supply 
Table 18 exhibits the impact of Askeskin on labor supply at the extensive and 
intensive margin by gender and by residence status in order to investigate the possible 
heterogeneity in impacts on labor supply.  We first investigate the impact at the extensive 
margin of labor supply by presenting the results of propensity score matching with 
difference in differences.  
             The results show an impact for the entire sample of 3% for the probability of 
working in the preceding week. This effect shown is significant at the 5% level.  It is only 
driven by women and urban areas. Women exhibit an impact on both the probability of 
working in the week preceding the survey and the year preceding the survey. This effect 
is negative and very significant. There is a decrease of 5.8% (at the 1% level) in the 
probability of working in the week preceding the survey and a decrease 4.7% (at the 5% 
level) in the probability of working in the year preceding the survey. For the probability of 
working in the preceding year, the effect in urban areas is negative and significant at the 
5% level. The magnitude of the effect is 3.4% on average. 
Concerning hours worked per week and weeks worked per year, the results are 
not significant for the full sample and the sample of men. However, for the sample of 
women and individuals living in urban areas, there is an effect on the number of hours 
worked per week. The effect is negative and significant at the 10% level. Women 
decreased their labor supply by 2.52 hours on average due to the program coverage and 
individuals in urban areas decreased their labor supply by 2.63 hours on average.  There 
is also a negative significant impact on the number of weeks worked per year for women. 
Overall, women decrease their labor supply by 2.11 weeks per year due to Askeskin.  
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Table 19 shows the results by further breaking down by gender in urban areas or 
rural areas. The effect is mainly driven by women in urban areas. However, in this case, 
since the sample is smaller, the results are less precise leading to less significance. 
The results for the intensive margin of labor supply are suggestive of the fact that 
women decrease the number of hours worked or weeks worked in order to engage in 
other activities. This is tantamount to an increase in income, which leads to substitution 
of work for leisure or other activities (for instance, family care activities). Due to the 
importance of expected health care costs as a proportion of income in developing 
countries and the prohibitively high cost of private insurance due to missing markets, this 
income effect can be important as shown by the estimates. The extensive margin 
estimates reveal that women may altogether decide to not participate in or exit the labor 
force if insurance coverage and health care consumption are determining factor for labor 
work. Since Askeskin provides medical goods and services free of charge, certain 
households that plan to pay for those goods or services may decrease the amount of 
work or cease labor force participation altogether. Additionally, individuals may decrease 
their labor supply or drop out of the labor force if they are risk averse to health care risk. 
This is because Askeskin eliminates risk by providing coverage to recipients, their 
spouses and dependents. For certain women, if the income effect from the benefit and 
the opportunity cost of working are high enough they may decide to drop out of the labor 
force and rely on the income of the primary earner. 
There are several possible explanations for these observations. The first one is 
that health insurance is valued by women higher than its expected value owing to a mix 
of aversion to risk, highly unpredictable health care expenses and missing market for 
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private health insurance in Indonesia. Women have higher expected health expense 
because they have the responsibility for both their own health care expenses and their 
dependents. The opportunity cost of labor work is also higher for women than men as 
they need to spend time in childcare or homemaking activities. As a result, the value 
associated to health insurance by women is expected to be high. 
The second reason is that certain women are working to provide incremental 
income to their household and at the margin; these women would prefer not to work or 
work part-time. In this case, as well, there could be an impact both at the extensive margin 
and intensive margin as this could determine the decision between working and not 
working (if the whole household is covered).  
Household dynamics can also explain the fact that we mainly observe an impact 
for women. In developing countries, traditionally, a woman’s status as primary earner may 
not be perceived well. In those societies, social norm dictates that men should be the 
main provider of the households. This way of thinking is still common in the lower income 
strata of most developing countries. As a result, although theoretically we should observe 
an impact for both men and women in a developing setting, it is much more likely that 
women will be more impacted. Therefore, in households where both household heads 
are working, it is more likely that women will decrease their labor supply in response to 
this benefit. This appears to be the case for Indonesia. 
This effect is observed primarily in urban areas for several potential reasons. The 
value of the benefit in urban areas is higher as there is more availability of health services 
at proximity. In rural areas, individuals are more likely to not seek enrollment or not value 
it as much because there is a high hidden cost associated with Askeskin in terms of 
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transportation, lower quality of care and less health supply available overall. Sumarto et 
al. (2011) point to the fact that in rural areas, transportation cost can be considerable for 
indigent families and discourage them from taking part in Askeskin. Moreover, he 
highlights the fact that the quality of care provided under Askeskin was lower in some 
cases. In some poor areas, there were accounts of certain services in the Askeskin benefit 
package that failed to be delivered. 
A second reason could be that in rural areas, the extended family is present to take 
care of the household when both heads of households are out working. In urban areas, 
this may not be the case and individuals need to coordinate themselves in order to take 
care of their households and children. Therefore, the wage earned in the urban labor 
market might not be attractive enough for women (especially of low socio-economic). 
Their large opportunity cost of working may cause them to drop out or reduce their labor 
supply. 
8.3.4. Effect by Education Level 
Individuals with higher education levels have a wider selection of jobs available to 
them in the labor market. The job search process is also easier. Moreover, they have 
access to jobs that require higher levels of skill. Those jobs are likely to be formal and 
provide better benefits than lower skill jobs. Individuals that have attained lower levels of 
education have a restricted selection of jobs available to them and those jobs are of lower 
quality and provide little to no benefits. They are also more likely to be low wage and 
informal.  
Individuals with lower levels of education have lower economic status and are less 
likely to accumulate savings or have any significant initial economic endowment. They 
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necessitate more work in order to provide for their family. They also are likely to work 
more hours in order to compensate for the lower wages. 
However, individuals with lower levels of education might value Askeskin more 
than the more educated individuals since they face important barriers of entry to the health 
insurance industry. In fact, prior to Askeskin, health insurance was provided exclusively 
through the formal sector and private insurance is prohibitively expensive or altogether 
missing. As a result, provision to Askeskin may be perceived as a large increase in wage 
as it provides coverage for an important portion of the households’ budgets. We therefore 
expect to see an effect on labor supply for individuals with lower educational status. 
Table 20 presents the results by educational level. There is no significant effect 
for individuals that have completed junior high school or more. However, we see effect 
on labor force participation in the previous year and for the number of weeks worked per 
year for individuals with less than elementary high school. The effects are significant at 
the 5% level. Individuals with less than elementary school education are 3.8% less likely 
to work in the preceding week and work 1.883 weeks less per year on average because 
of receiving Askeskin. 
8.3.5. Effect for Individuals with Higher Valuation for Askeskin 
We further investigate the hypothesis that individuals that may theoretically value 
the benefit more should exhibit an important effect. The groups examined are married 
women, individuals with low health status, older individuals.  
For married women, Table 21 shows that the only impact observed is on labor 
supply at the extensive margin. The impact is large and very significant impact (at the 1% 
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level). Married women are 7.2% less likely to participate in the labor market in the 
precedent week and the precedent year. This impact intuitive because these households 
have higher expected health care costs. Therefore, households that were previously not 
covered by health insurance find their households’ budget relieved from health care costs. 
Medical care costs can be large and impose a large burden upon lower income 
households. The financial effect of Askeskin leads a portion of married women to leave 
the workforce. The larger magnitude of the effect for the sample of married women as 
opposed to all women is intuitive as married women are much more likely to have children 
and higher health care costs. This reinforces the idea the individuals with higher value of 
insurance should exhibit a larger impact. 
The sample of individuals with lower health status is obtained by restricting the 
sample to individuals that are somewhat unhealthy or unhealthy using the self-reported 
health status variable. The sample of individuals with lower health status is small. 
However, we still find an impact on labor supply at the extensive margin at the 5% level. 
Individuals with lower health status are 7.5% less likely to work in the precedent week 
due to enrollment in Askeskin. Individuals with lower health status have much lower 
propensity to work and exhibit lower productivity. Therefore, it is more likely that 
individuals with lower health status would abandon their employment after receiving the 
benefits. As a result, for these individuals, receiving Askeskin provides strong incentives 
to drop out of the labor force altogether. 
Older individuals are defined as individuals that are still in working age but in the 
older tranche of the labor force. In order to conserve a large enough sample, we restrict 
our sample to individuals that are 35 to 65 years of age. Based on Table 21, we observe 
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a very significant impact at both the extensive margin and the intensive margin of labor 
supply. Older individuals are 0.9% less likely to work in the precedent year due to the 
availability of Askeskin. This impact is significant at the 1% level. In addition, Askeskin 
leads to a decrease of 1.653 weeks worked per year on average for recipients. The 
coefficient is significant at the 5% level. This impact is consistent with previous research 
in the US by Gruber and Madrian (2002) that find that availability of subsidized insurance 
increases the odd of retirement. In this case, individuals that were working solely to retain 
their benefits are likely either to drop out or to reduce their quantity of work. 
8.3.6. Labor Market Transitions 
Following Azuara and Marinescu (2013), I test for potential impacts on labor 
market transitions. Table 22 provides propensity score matching estimates of transition 
probabilities between different employment statuses (informal, formal and 
unemployment). As discussed above, theoretically, the provision of free health insurance 
should render informality more desirable, and as a result, an effect on the transitions 
towards informality may be observed. Thus in this section, we investigate the impact of 
Askeskin on various transition probabilities towards informality:  unemployed to informal 
status, formal to informal status, informal to informal status. As a sanity check, we also 
investigate the transitions towards formality, namely:  from informal to formal status and 
from unemployed to formal status. I generated several dichotomous variables that take 
value 1 for a certain transition (change in labor status from the pre-treatment period to the 
post-treatment period), conditional on being in a certain status in the first wave. 
Consistent to my results on informality, I do not observe any effect on any 
transitions. As expected, the transitions from formal to informal are positive in sign 
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however the magnitude is very small and insignificant. Therefore, we cannot infer any 
movement from the formal sector to the informal sector. The coefficients on the transition 
from informal to formal and from unemployment to formal are positive. In addition, the 
movement from unemployment to informal sector is negative. However, the estimates are 
not significant, which is not suggestive of any movement between these employment 
statuses. The sign of these coefficients could be suggestive that despite the introduction 
of Askeskin in the informal sector, formal jobs are still more desirable and hardly 
substitutable to informal sector jobs. Hence, the benefit provided through Askeskin might 
be barely enough to push individuals to move to the informal sector. Since the signs of all 
the coefficients on transitions are statistically insignificant, we conclude that Askeskin 
does not have an impact on the transitions across different sectors of the labor market. 
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Chapter Nine: Study Limitations 
  
The first limitation of this study is the lag between the two surveys used. The seven-
year lag could be an obstacle in identifying an impact if individuals changed significantly 
in the seven-year lapse. For instance, an individual that was 18 in the first survey would 
be more likely to be in the labor force in the second survey, as they would have graduated. 
However, this may not be an important issue in this study for two reasons. I am comparing 
the outcomes of Askeskin recipients with outcomes of comparable non-recipients. 
Askeskin targets individuals that are poor or near poor. These individuals are more likely 
to be out of the schooling early and to join the workforce at an early age. The proportion 
of Askeskin recipients that have attended high school or higher education is low. Based 
on the IFLS4, about 12% of Askeskin recipient have completed high school and only 
about 2% have completed higher education. Moreover, the effects on labor force 
participation and quantity of work are still significant when restricting the sample to 
individuals that are 35 to 65 (for which the propensity of retention in the workforce is 
homogenous). 
In addition, it could be argued that since the economic environment has changed 
significantly during those seven years, the impacts observed could be due to changes in 
macroeconomic conditions instead of real changes in labor market behavior due to the 
availability of Askeskin. The proxy-means tested score and community level variables 
allow controlling for several infrastructure and economic factors that would be affected by 
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the changes in macroeconomic conditions. These could be considered suitable proxies 
for macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, residence dummies (urban vs. rural) and 
province dummies that control for spatial differences in demographic and economic 
conditions are included. One of the robustness checks was to test whether there was an 
effect for Askeskin recipient using two surveys prior the program implementations. Those 
two surveys were much closer in time and the economic conditions were greatly varying. 
The period between 1997 and 2000 include the important South Asian recession with a 
large decrease in economic activity and the recovery period starting in 1999. Therefore, 
if changes in labor supply were related to changes in economic condition we would have 
observed an impact on labor force participation, quantity of work or informality during that 
period. The lack of impact suggests that the empirical strategy and controls used in the 
study successfully account for changes in macroeconomic condition. 
The second limitation is related to the estimation method. Although propensity 
score matching with difference in differences is robust to time invariant unobservable 
variables, it is not robust to time variant unobservable variables. If certain factors that 
affect both labor outcomes and eligibility or enrollment in Askeskin are unobservable and 
vary with time, this could cause our estimates to be biased. It is difficult to account for it. 
An example of a time-varying factor would be the talent or skill of individuals that could 
change over time as they become more skilled through either the school system, their life 
experience or self-training.  As mentioned, the test for ignorability assumption using the 
two surveys prior to the start of Askeskin (IFLS2 and IFLS3) provides an indication that 
this effect may not be as important. In fact, if the time-varying unobservables were driving 
the changes observed in our main analysis, I would observe some effect between those 
92 
 
two surveys. However, no effect is observed. To conclude, it is difficult to rule out that the 
effect is not partially due to time varying unobservable as it is difficult to account for it 
accurately. Only a perfectly designed randomized control trial or a perfect random 
assignment of Askeskin based on a natural experiment would rule out this effect. 
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Chapter Ten: Conclusion 
 
  This paper has analyzed the impact of the expansion of social health insurance for 
the poor on labor supply and informality in Indonesia. The results of study suggest that 
expanding health insurance to the uncovered portion of the population in a lower middle-
income country where health insurance is mainly provided by the formal sector may have 
an impact on labor outcomes. When the country extends government-funded health 
insurance to a large proportion of vulnerable individuals, this can provide disincentives to 
work.  The results indicate that the effect emerges mostly in the trade-off between work 
and non-work and on the quantity of work. Nevertheless, the effect on informality is 
inconclusive as the coefficients obtained from the analysis are statistically insignificant. 
In the wake of large pushes for universal health reform across the developing world, 
governments should anticipate a decline in labor force participation. Expansions that 
provide health insurance to groups that associate a higher value to the health insurance 
benefit should observe an even larger impact as suggested by the Indonesian experience. 
These effects need to be considered while implementing those programs as they can be 
impeding economic growth due to an adverse impact on labor force participation. The 
impact of Askeskin seem to be present only for women and urban areas. Women from 
recipient households are more likely to drop out of the labor force because the benefit 
provides them with the ability to receive all of the health care they and their family need 
at virtually no cost.   In addition, these impacts appear to be more concentrated among 
94 
 
demographics that are more vulnerable (namely married women, older individuals, less 
educated, and poor and near poor) which can have nefarious consequences and help 
perpetuate the poverty trap. Moreover, in most countries, the labor force participation of 
women is already lower than men, which leaves them in a vulnerable position. A program 
that decreases further the labor force participation of women may worsen the condition 
of this demographic group. 
Concerning the incentive to work in the informal sector, no effect is observed. 
Since all estimates are statistically insignificant, the introduction of Askeskin does not 
suggest an effect on the choice between informal and formal sector employment. This 
may be due to the segmented nature of the labor market in Indonesia where formal jobs 
are more desirable. This is a hopeful message for policy makers and governments around 
the world as they prepare their transition towards universal health care. In fact, a 
considerable impact on informality would have important implications on government tax 
revenues as well as poverty levels (Devicienti, Fernando and Groisma, 2010). It could 
have unintended effects and work against the policy makers’ agenda. Informal jobs are 
precarious and less stable, leave workers unprotected from economic shocks, and do not 
provide any protection. There is suggestive evidence that informal jobs are related to 
more poverty and ultimately impede economic development (World Bank, 2006). For 
these reasons, the results this study on the impact of health insurance for the poor on 
informality may be reassuring for policy makers.  
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Table 1: Description of the Three Major Existing Health Insurance Plans in 
Indonesia 
 
Attribute  Askes  Jamsostek  Askeskin  
Establishment  1968 1992 2005 
Population 
Coverage  
19.12 million (about 
8.28% of the population) 
in 2007* 
11.18 million (about 
4.84% of the population) 
in 2007* 
42.48 million (about 
18.3% of the 
population) in 2007* 
Participation  Mandatory  
Mandatory for firms with 
more than 10 workers or 
payroll of over 1M rupiahs 
per month; opt-out option 
for employers with better 
benefit plans 
Social Insurance, 
selected based on 
government determined 
criteria  
Organization 
Carrier  
State-owned company 
(PT Askes Indonesia) 
State-owned company 
(PT Jamsostek Indonesia) 
Ministry of Health  
Beneficiaries  
Civil servants, pensioners 
of civil servants and 
armed forces  
Formal private employees 
Identified Poor and 
Near-Poor 
Eligible 
dependents  
Spouse and 2 oldest 
children over 21 years of 
age or over 25 years if 
student  
Spouse and 3 oldest 
children over 21 years of 
age  
Whole Household 
Contribution 
Borne by employee and 
government. Members: 
2% of basic salary. 
Government: 2% of basic 
salary. 
Borne by the employer: 
Single member- 3% of 
salary. Member with 
dependents: 6% of salary. 
Borne by the 
government. No 
contribution by the 
beneficiary. 
Benefit Package 
Outpatient and inpatient 
care at public providers 
only  
Outpatient care at both 
public and private 
providers networks, and 
for inpatient care at public 
providers  
Outpatient and inpatient 
care at public providers 
and a third of private 
providers 
Copayment  
Yes, if members want to 
upgrade class, branded 
drugs, renal dialysis, 
heart surgery and 
transplants  
None, but does not cover 
high cost treatments such 
as cancer treatment, heart 
surgery and renal dialysis  
None  
Negative list  
Cosmetic surgery, 
physical check-up, 
alternative medicine, 
dental prostheses, fertility 
treatment, non-basic 
immunization  
General check-up, cancer 
treatment, heart surgery, 
renal dialysis, prostheses, 
non-basic immunization, 
transplantation, fertility 
treatment  
Cosmetic surgery, 
physical check-up, 
alternative medicine, 
dental prostheses, 
fertility treatment  
Note:  Based on Rokx et al (2009) and Aji et al. (2013), *Authors own estimates from the IFLS. 
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Table 2: HI Coverage Before and After the Implementation of Askeskin 
Health Insurance 
Program  2000 2007 
Askeskin  0.00% 18.39% 
Askes 7.96% 8.28% 
Jamsostek 3.41% 4.84% 
Private Insurance  0.39% 0.99% 
Note: Data from the third wave  and fourth waves of the IFLS 
 
Table 3: Trend in Public Health Expenditure between 1995 and 2007 
Rp trillion                
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
National Nominal Health Expenditures 9.3 11.0 16.0 17.7 22.2 31.8 39.0 
Real National Health Expenditures (2001=100) 9.3 9.8 13.4 14.0 15.9 20.1 23.2 
Annual Rate Growth Real Health Expenditures 
(%) 
42.8 6.3 36.5 4.2 13.3 27.0 15.4 
Health Expenditures as % of Total Expenditures  2.6 3.3 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.5 5.0 
National Health Expenditures as % of GDP 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.1 
Overall National Health Expenditures 353.6 337.6 405.4 441.8 533.6 699.5 786.9 
Overall Real National Expenditures (2001=100) 353.6 301.8 340.0 348.9 381.4 443.2 469.2 
Source: World Bank (2008)               
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Table 4: Central Bureau of Statistics’ Official Definition of Informality 
Official Definition of Informal Status of the Indonesian Government  
Formal Workers: 
  
- Self-employed with permanent workers 
- Individual employed in the formal private sector or by the 
government  
  
Informal Workers: 
  
- Self-employed without employees  
- Self-employed assisted by a temporary worker  
- Casual and Family workers 
  
Note:    Based on the BPS’ 2015 “Statistics on Informality in Indonesia” official report. 
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OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE
Askeskin -0.02* -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.09*** -0.02* 0.05 -3.27*** -1.10* -1.52 -1.89*** -0.78** 0.50
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.50) (0.61) (1.79) (0.30) (0.37) (1.20)
Age 0.00* 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.11*** 0.01 0.14*** 0.19***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
Male 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.28*** 0.24*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 3.34*** 5.06*** 0.39 -0.29
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.47) (0.97) (0.29) (0.65)
Married 0.02* 0.13*** 0.02* 0.16*** 0.05*** 0.05* 1.28* 2.73* 0.86** 1.93**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.70) (1.40) (0.43) (0.93)
Elementary School -0.02 0.05** -0.02 0.04* 0.00 0.10*** 1.13 2.79 -0.21 0.35
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.82) (1.74) (0.50) (1.17)
Junior High School -0.08*** -0.01 -0.07*** -0.00 -0.01 0.10** 0.93 0.82 -0.10 -0.41
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (1.01) (2.18) (0.62) (1.46)
Senior High School -0.04** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.03 -0.11*** 0.01 0.09 0.09 -0.44 1.41
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (1.06) (2.24) (0.65) (1.50)
Higher Education 0.06*** 0.10** 0.04** 0.14*** -0.33*** -0.15*** -5.41*** -7.31*** 0.34 0.80
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (1.25) (2.64) (0.77) (1.77)
Health Status -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.00 -0.01 -0.71 -1.15 -0.46 0.12
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.47) (1.04) (0.29) (0.69)
Proxy Means Tested Score -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00*** -0.00 -0.11*** -0.14*** -0.05*** -0.07***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Health Card -0.02* -0.02 -0.02** -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.38 -0.96 -0.94*** -1.04
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.58) (1.16) (0.36) (0.78)
Askes -0.01 0.00 -0.02* -0.05** -0.26*** -0.25*** -1.87** -0.65 1.63*** 1.67
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.91) (1.82) (0.56) (1.22)
Jamsostek 0.11*** 0.18*** 0.10*** 0.18*** -0.43*** -0.41*** 4.43*** 6.96*** 4.58*** 4.94***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (1.02) (2.18) (0.63) (1.46)
Unconditional Cash Transfer 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.06* -1.37** -1.32 -0.26 -1.75
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.59) (1.67) (0.36) (1.11)
Household's Head Age -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 -0.07*** -0.08 -0.07*** -0.06*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
Household Size -0.00** -0.00 -0.01*** -0.01* -0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.14 -0.03 -0.09
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.21) (0.06) (0.14)
Household Head is Female 0.02 0.13*** 0.04*** 0.13*** -0.02 -0.07** -0.53 1.77 0.41 0.56
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.81) (1.59) (0.50) (1.07)
Number of Children <12 Years -0.02*** -0.02** -0.02*** -0.01* 0.01 -0.02 0.24 0.82 -0.19 0.11
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.26) (0.54) (0.16) (0.36)
Presence of Asphalt Road -0.03** -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.06*** 0.03 2.16** 0.12 1.82*** 1.31
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.84) (1.58) (0.51) (1.06)
Presence of a Midw ife 0.00 0.03* 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06** -2.37*** -0.52 0.08 -0.79
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.62) (1.17) (0.38) (0.78)
% of Households w ith Electricity -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00* 0.07*** 0.07** -0.01 -0.04*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Presence of a Sew age System 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.03*** 0.01 0.84 1.37 0.03 -0.68
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.56) (1.24) (0.34) (0.83)
Presence of Piped Water -0.01 -0.05*** 0.00 -0.04** -0.02 -0.08*** -1.48** -0.32 0.26 0.33
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.62) (1.27) (0.38) (0.85)
Number of Health Centers -0.00* 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 0.07 0.09 -0.03 -0.13**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.09) (0.03) (0.06)
Subjective Village Wealth 0.00 -0.01 0.01* -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.13 -0.93 -0.44** -0.33
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.32) (0.71) (0.20) (0.48)
Urban Area -0.05*** 0.03 -0.05*** 0.00 -0.09*** -0.11*** 3.33*** 3.95*** 0.23 0.88
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.62) (1.30) (0.38) (0.87)
Province Dummies X X X X X X X X X X
Observations 18,172 12,317 14,109 19,714 12,309 14,107 13,828 9,554 10,042 14,059 9,698 10,109 14,055 9,696 10,109
R-Squared 0.00 0.14 0.17 0.00 0.16 0.21 0.01 0.31 0.24 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.08
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 

Table 5: OLS and FE Results for the Full Sample
Worked (previous week) Worked (previous year)  Informality Hours per week Weeks per year 
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OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE
Askeskin -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.10*** -0.04** 0.02 -2.81*** -1.03 2.11 -1.61*** -0.66 1.20
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.63) (0.78) (3.24) (0.40) (0.50) (2.22)
Age -0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.17*** 0.05 0.15*** 0.11
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.10) (0.02) (0.07)
Male 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married 0.14*** 0.26*** 0.12*** 0.27*** 0.04** -0.05 3.18*** 3.54 1.50** 2.72
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (1.03) (2.83) (0.66) (1.94)
Elementary School -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.03 -0.02 -0.51 3.16 -1.82** -4.62*
(0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.08) (1.27) (3.98) (0.82) (2.74)
Junior High School -0.06*** -0.03 -0.04*** 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.89 2.52 -1.81* -4.87
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.10) (1.45) (4.63) (0.93) (3.17)
Senior High School -0.01 -0.04 -0.04** 0.04 -0.11*** -0.15 -0.67 2.22 -1.58 -2.91
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.10) (1.50) (4.56) (0.96) (3.13)
Higher Education -0.01 0.08 -0.03* 0.14** -0.27*** -0.13 -6.21*** -3.69 -1.00 -7.13**
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.11) (1.77) (5.23) (1.14) (3.61)
Health Status -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.09*** 0.00 0.02 -1.01* -3.28 -0.06 1.03
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.61) (2.00) (0.39) (1.36)
Proxy Means Tested Score -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00*** -0.00 -0.08*** -0.05 -0.03*** -0.08**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04)
Health Card -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.42 -3.01 -1.02** -1.42
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.75) (2.13) (0.48) (1.46)
Askes -0.03** -0.07 -0.06*** -0.12*** -0.33*** -0.39*** -2.13* -1.47 1.64** 2.50
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.07) (1.20) (3.30) (0.78) (2.27)
Jamsostek 0.06*** 0.11** 0.04*** 0.07 -0.44*** -0.41*** 1.39 4.40 4.57*** 4.78*
(0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.09) (1.29) (4.05) (0.83) (2.77)
Unconditional Cash Transfer -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.06 -1.04 -2.20 -0.36 -1.77
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.76) (2.92) (0.49) (1.99)
Household's Head Age -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 0.00*** -0.00 -0.07** -0.02 -0.08*** 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.09) (0.02) (0.06)
Household Size -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.01** -0.00 -0.00 0.17 -0.37 -0.08 -0.20
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.13) (0.35) (0.08) (0.24)
Household Head is Female -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -2.93** 2.97 1.11 -0.88
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (1.42) (3.59) (0.92) (2.46)
Number of Children <12 Years 0.01* 0.01 0.00 0.02* -0.00 -0.03 0.64* 2.19** 0.08 0.27
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.34) (0.96) (0.22) (0.66)
Presence of Asphalt Road -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.07*** 0.03 3.19*** -2.06 1.44** 2.74
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (1.08) (2.97) (0.69) (2.04)
Presence of a Midw ife 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.07 -2.04** 0.54 0.54 -0.59
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.80) (2.12) (0.52) (1.45)
% of Households w ith Electricity -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 0.06*** 0.09 -0.00 -0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04)
Presence of a Sew age System 0.02 0.05 -0.00 0.03 0.04** 0.03 1.23* 4.52** -0.15 -0.27
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.72) (2.14) (0.46) (1.46)
Presence of Piped Water -0.01 -0.06** 0.00 -0.08*** -0.02 -0.07 -1.62** -1.02 0.27 -1.98
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.80) (2.21) (0.52) (1.51)
Number of Health Centers -0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 0.23*** 0.32* -0.08** 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.17) (0.04) (0.12)
Subjective Village Wealth 0.01** 0.01 0.02*** 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.28 -0.33 -0.05 -0.12
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.41) (1.31) (0.26) (0.90)
Urban Area -0.05*** -0.03 -0.02*** -0.00 -0.11*** -0.21*** 2.86*** 5.05** 0.01 1.39
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.80) (2.33) (0.51) (1.60)
Province Dummies X X X X X X X X X X
Observations 8,425 5,640 6,599 9,297 5,636 6,599 7,649 5,106 5,498 7,813 5,205 5,542 7,812 5,205 5,544
R-Squared 0.00 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.09 0.34 0.01 0.30 0.25 0.00 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.05 0.11
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 

Table 6: OLS and FE Results for the Sample of Men
Worked (previous week) Worked (previous year)  Informality Hours per week Weeks per year 
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OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE
Askeskin -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.06 0.08*** 0.00 0.06 -3.83*** -1.24 -0.96 -2.23*** -0.91 3.20
(0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.07) (0.80) (0.95) (4.65) (0.46) (0.56) (2.87)
Age 0.00 0.01*** -0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.10** -0.08 0.12*** 0.17**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.13) (0.02) (0.08)
Male 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married -0.05*** 0.02 -0.04*** 0.08** 0.09*** 0.15*** 0.00 -0.55 -0.16 -1.19
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (1.06) (3.37) (0.63) (2.08)
Elementary School -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.15** 2.19* 5.54 0.54 3.37
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (1.12) (3.98) (0.66) (2.46)
Junior High School -0.08*** -0.03 -0.08*** 0.00 0.01 0.11 2.74* 6.15 1.00 0.88
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.09) (1.49) (5.30) (0.88) (3.26)
Senior High School -0.04 -0.00 -0.05* 0.05 -0.11*** 0.06 1.01 1.87 -0.19 1.53
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.09) (1.59) (5.68) (0.94) (3.50)
Higher Education 0.14*** 0.13* 0.13*** 0.27*** -0.40*** -0.37*** -4.61** -4.28 0.84 2.71
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.11) (1.83) (6.54) (1.08) (4.03)
Health Status -0.03*** -0.05* -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.31 0.23 -0.94** -1.14
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.72) (2.57) (0.42) (1.59)
Proxy Means Tested Score -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.13*** 0.00 -0.07*** -0.06
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.08) (0.01) (0.05)
Health Card -0.02 0.01 -0.03* -0.00 -0.01 -0.10** -0.35 2.71 -0.85 -2.89
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.90) (2.95) (0.53) (1.82)
Askes 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.21*** -0.23*** -1.89 6.71 1.64** 8.60***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (1.39) (4.48) (0.82) (2.76)
Jamsostek 0.13*** 0.31*** 0.13*** 0.31*** -0.40*** -0.46*** 7.72*** 7.69 4.42*** 0.25
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.09) (1.63) (5.64) (0.96) (3.48)
Unconditional Cash Transfer 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.06 -0.03** 0.06 -1.67* -5.70 -0.15 -2.97
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.07) (0.91) (4.42) (0.53) (2.72)
Household's Head Age 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.10 -0.04** -0.14*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.12) (0.02) (0.08)
Household Size -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.01 -0.00* 0.01 -0.02 -0.33 0.01 0.16
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.15) (0.59) (0.09) (0.36)
Household Head is Female -0.01 0.11*** 0.02 0.14*** 0.00 0.04 -0.35 -1.62 -0.10 -2.79
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (1.10) (3.67) (0.65) (2.26)
Number of Children <12 Years -0.05*** -0.04** -0.05*** -0.03* 0.02*** -0.02 -0.38 0.07 -0.56** -1.79**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.41) (1.45) (0.24) (0.90)
Presence of Asphalt Road -0.05** -0.03 -0.04* 0.02 -0.05** -0.02 0.93 -1.45 2.10*** -0.56
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (1.30) (3.89) (0.77) (2.40)
Presence of a Midw ife 0.01 0.08** 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.01 -2.60*** -3.61 -0.40 -3.91**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.95) (2.80) (0.56) (1.72)
% of Households w ith Electricity -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 0.07*** -0.01 -0.02* -0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.05)
Presence of a Sew age System -0.01 -0.04 -0.03* -0.04 0.02 0.03 0.43 -1.63 0.23 -2.32
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.88) (3.09) (0.51) (1.91)
Presence of Piped Water -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -1.45 -0.55 0.27 0.46
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.97) (3.27) (0.57) (2.01)
Number of Health Centers -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01** -0.00 -0.00 -0.10 -0.27 0.03 -0.30**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.24) (0.05) (0.15)
Subjective Village Wealth -0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.58 1.51 -0.84*** 0.83
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.49) (1.86) (0.29) (1.15)
Urban Area -0.05*** 0.09** -0.07*** 0.03 -0.08*** -0.01 3.75*** 6.11* 0.48 -0.21
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.97) (3.26) (0.57) (2.01)
Province Dummies X X X X X X X X X X
Observations 9,747 6,677 7,510 10,417 6,673 7,508 6,179 4,448 4,544 6,246 4,493 4,567 6,243 4,491 4,565
R-Squared 0.00 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.34 0.37 0.00 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.15
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 

Table 7: OLS and FE Results for the Sample of Women
Worked (previous week) Worked (previous year)  Informality Hours per week Weeks per year 
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OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE
Askeskin -0.02* -0.02 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.09*** -0.02 0.15 -4.51*** -1.66* -4.19 -1.39*** -0.62 4.37
(0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.75) (1.00) (4.88) (0.44) (0.59) (2.91)
Age -0.00 0.01*** -0.00** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.14*** 0.03 0.17*** 0.32***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.13) (0.02) (0.08)
Male 0.28*** 0.24*** 0.32*** 0.25*** -0.10*** -0.12** 2.67*** 1.13 -0.43 -0.23
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.75) (2.46) (0.44) (1.47)
Married 0.01 0.10** 0.01 0.13*** 0.05*** -0.01 1.61 5.72 0.82 0.37
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.07) (1.06) (3.59) (0.62) (2.14)
Elementary School 0.01 0.12 -0.00 0.10 0.01 -0.00 -0.63 5.19 -0.03 4.13
(0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.12) (1.66) (6.10) (0.98) (3.68)
Junior High School -0.05* 0.12 -0.07** 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.67 1.98 -0.59 2.58
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.13) (1.87) (6.84) (1.10) (4.12)
Senior High School -0.03 0.14* -0.05* 0.13 -0.13*** -0.12 -1.24 2.52 0.02 6.09
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.13) (1.87) (6.64) (1.10) (4.01)
Higher Education 0.07** 0.25*** 0.06* 0.29*** -0.29*** -0.19 -6.65*** -2.94 0.82 4.44
(0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.14) (2.07) (7.13) (1.21) (4.33)
Health Status -0.04*** -0.03 -0.02** -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.06 -2.96 -0.02 -0.93
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.72) (2.63) (0.42) (1.57)
Proxy Means Tested Score -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.08*** -0.09 -0.06*** -0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.09) (0.01) (0.05)
Health Card -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -1.61* -0.76 -0.16 2.04
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.93) (3.02) (0.54) (1.82)
Askes -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.27*** -0.33*** -3.19*** -5.67 1.08 0.59
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.09) (1.20) (4.43) (0.70) (2.64)
Jamsostek 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.16*** -0.37*** -0.25*** 3.19** 6.55 4.26*** 3.15
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.09) (1.31) (4.54) (0.77) (2.71)
Unconditional Cash Transfer 0.01 0.01 0.03* 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -2.60** 1.20 0.03 -4.27
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.09) (1.02) (4.70) (0.59) (2.81)
Household's Head Age -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 0.00** -0.00 -0.08** -0.03 -0.08*** -0.08
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.13) (0.02) (0.08)
Household Size -0.00 -0.01 -0.00* -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 0.15 -0.33 0.02 0.22
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.14) (0.58) (0.08) (0.35)
Household Head is Female 0.04** 0.09* 0.05*** 0.06 -0.04* -0.14* -1.04 -0.78 -0.10 0.29
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.08) (1.19) (4.12) (0.69) (2.46)
Number of Children <12 Years -0.01** -0.00 -0.02*** -0.02 0.02** 0.02 -0.56 -0.44 -0.43* -0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.41) (1.52) (0.24) (0.91)
Presence of Asphalt Road -0.03 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.47*** 3.82 10.27 10.47*** -3.68
(0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.16) (4.48) (8.08) (2.61) (4.86)
Presence of a Midw ife 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 -2.61*** 0.75 0.10 -2.68
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.07) (0.91) (3.33) (0.53) (1.99)
% of Households w ith Electricity -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.08** -0.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.25) (0.04) (0.15)
Presence of a Sew age System 0.02 -0.07 -0.01 -0.08* 0.03 0.17** 2.98*** 7.81* 0.05 2.40
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.08) (1.15) (4.07) (0.67) (2.43)
Presence of Piped Water 0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.49 -7.32* -0.95 -1.13
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.08) (1.12) (4.18) (0.65) (2.50)
Number of Health Centers -0.00** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00** 0.00 0.10* 0.20 -0.05 -0.08
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.17) (0.04) (0.10)
Subjective Village Wealth 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.00 0.02 0.24 -3.27 -0.06 -1.86
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.50) (2.42) (0.29) (1.45)
Urban Area 
Province Dummies X X X X X X X X X X
Observations 9,735 5,802 6,859 10,716 5,798 6,857 7,041 4,218 4,556 7,199 4,310 4,598 7,192 4,302 4,595
R-Squared 0.00 0.13 0.19 0.00 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.27 0.24 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.05 0.15
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 

Table 8: OLS and FE Results for the Urban Sample
Worked (previous week) Worked (previous year)  Informality Hours per week Weeks per year 
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OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE
Askeskin -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.05*** -0.02 0.05 -1.31** -0.75 -0.32 -2.13*** -1.27*** -2.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.66) (0.76) (3.14) (0.42) (0.49) (2.15)
Age 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.01*** -0.09*** -0.08 0.12*** 0.13*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.10) (0.02) (0.07)
Male 0.25*** 0.30*** 0.26*** 0.26*** -0.05*** -0.07** 3.82*** 5.40*** 0.99** -1.16
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.60) (1.87) (0.39) (1.28)
Married 0.03* 0.17*** 0.03* 0.23*** 0.05*** -0.02 1.31 5.89** 0.92 0.58
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.94) (2.86) (0.61) (1.96)
Elementary School -0.03* -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 1.76* 4.14 -0.36 -2.43
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.92) (2.87) (0.59) (1.97)
Junior High School -0.08*** -0.01 -0.06*** 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.42 3.73 0.14 -3.68
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (1.21) (3.85) (0.78) (2.64)
Senior High School -0.03 -0.06 -0.04** -0.05 -0.07*** -0.07 0.28 -0.96 -1.16 -2.23
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (1.37) (4.11) (0.88) (2.82)
Higher Education 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.11 -0.42*** -0.46*** -5.64*** -3.30 -0.19 -6.50*
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.09) (1.76) (5.20) (1.13) (3.56)
Health Status -0.05*** -0.05* -0.03*** -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -1.54** -0.79 -0.75* 0.84
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.61) (1.89) (0.39) (1.28)
Proxy Means Tested Score -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00*** -0.00 -0.12*** -0.25*** -0.05*** -0.11***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04)
Health Card -0.02* 0.02 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.03 0.74 4.50* -1.27*** -1.45
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.74) (2.37) (0.48) (1.62)
Askes 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.26*** -0.22*** 0.63 -0.64 1.82* 4.86*
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (1.48) (4.00) (0.95) (2.75)
Jamsostek 0.11*** 0.30*** 0.11*** 0.22** -0.58*** -0.52*** 6.45*** 3.30 5.65*** 6.42
(0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.12) (1.74) (6.84) (1.12) (4.69)
Unconditional Cash Transfer -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.08 -0.59 -2.35 -0.33 -0.91
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.71) (2.88) (0.46) (1.97)
Household's Head Age -0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00* 0.00* -0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05** -0.08
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.09) (0.02) (0.06)
Household Size -0.00 0.01 -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.57 -0.11 -0.10
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.13) (0.36) (0.08) (0.25)
Household Head is Female -0.00 0.10** 0.02 0.13*** -0.00 -0.03 0.15 1.39 0.92 -2.95
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (1.11) (3.20) (0.71) (2.19)
Number of Children <12 Years -0.02*** -0.03* -0.02*** -0.03** -0.00 -0.00 0.97*** 2.30** 0.09 0.42
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.34) (0.97) (0.22) (0.66)
Presence of Asphalt Road -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04*** 0.13*** 2.79*** -1.86 1.40** 3.06*
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.86) (2.66) (0.55) (1.82)
Presence of a Midw ife -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 -1.51 0.82 0.01 -0.52
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.93) (3.05) (0.60) (2.09)
% of Households w ith Electricity -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00 0.08*** -0.11* -0.01 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04)
Presence of a Sew age System -0.00 0.04 -0.02* 0.03 0.03*** 0.02 -0.08 -4.07* 0.32 -0.45
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.65) (2.17) (0.42) (1.49)
Presence of Piped Water -0.03* -0.07* -0.02* -0.07** -0.03** -0.07 -1.67** 1.43 0.62 1.16
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.80) (2.79) (0.51) (1.91)
Number of Health Centers -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01* -0.00** 0.02*** -0.13 0.49 0.04 -0.11
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.11) (0.37) (0.07) (0.25)
Subjective Village Wealth 0.01 -0.04 0.02*** -0.02 0.01* -0.00 -0.35 0.93 -1.20*** -2.75**
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.47) (1.94) (0.30) (1.33)
Urban Area 
Province Dummies X X X X X X X X X X
Observations 8,437 6,515 7,250 8,998 6,511 7,250 6,787 5,336 5,486 6,860 5,388 5,511 6,863 5,394 5,514
R-Squared 0.00 0.14 0.23 0.00 0.16 0.27 0.00 0.26 0.23 0.00 0.08 0.15 0.00 0.06 0.11
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 

Table 9: OLS and FE Results for the Rural Sample
Worked (previous week) Worked (previous year)  Informality Hours per week Weeks per year 
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Table 10: Cross-Sectional Propensity Score Matching Estimates 
 
ATT ATT ATT ATT ATT
s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e.
T=3,243 -0.016 T=1,493 -0.027* T=1,750 -0.027* T=1,552 -0.011 T=1,691 -0.02
C=14,929 (0.01) C=6,932 (0.016) C=7,997 (0.016) C=8,183 (0.016) C=6,746 (0.014)
T=3,515 -0.005 T=1,634 -0.018 T=1,881 -0.018 T=1,696 0.008 T=1,819 -0.014
C=16,199 (0.01) C=7,663 (0.018) C=8,536 (0.018) C=9,020 (0.016) C=7,179 (0.013)
T=2,477 -0.017 T=1,374 -0.026 T=1,103 -0.003 T=1,120 -0.018 T=1,357 -0.016
C=11,357 (0.012) C=6,275 (0.016) C=5,076 (0.015) C=5,921 (0.018) C=5,430 (0.013)
T=2,493 -1.64*** T=1,386 -1.246** T=1,107 -1.82* T=1,133 -2.691*** T=1,360 -0.779
C=11,566 (0.63) C=6,427 (0.573) C=5,139 (0.8) C=6,066 (0.833) C=5,500 (0.884)
T=2,493 -1.00** T=1,385 -0.798 T=1,108 -1.246** T=1,133 -0.515 T=1,360 -1.35***
C=11,562 (0.408) C=6,427 (0.563) C=5,135 (0.573) C=6,059 (0.587) C=5,503 (0.444)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. propensity score matching estimates by Kernel matching.  ATT: average treatment effect on the treated. Standard errors in parentheses.
C represents the control units whereas T represents the treated units.
Dependent Variable
Full Sample Men Women Urban
t-stat Obs. t-stat
Rural
Worked (Previous Week)
Worked (Previous Year)
Informality
Hours per Week
Weeks per Year
Obs. t-stat Obs. t-stat Obs. Obs. t-stat
-1.60 -1.69 -1.69 -0.69 -1.43
-3.05
0.50
-1.00
-3.23
-0.88
-0.50
-1.42
-2.60
-2.45
-1.00
0.07
-1.66
-2.16
-1.00
-1.63
-2.17
-1.42
-1.08
-1.23
-0.88
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Table 11: Testing the Ignorability of Treatment Assumption Using IFLS2 and IFLS3 
 
 
 
ATT ATT ATT ATT ATT
s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e.
T=2264 -0.004 T=1,038 -0.016 T=1226 0.003 T=1054 0.003 T=1210 -0.009
C=6547 (0.013) C=3,014  (0.018) C=3533 (0.02) C=3298 (0.018) C=3249 (0.019)
T=2264 0 T=1038 -0.005 T=1226 0.003 T=1054 0 T=1210 0
C=6548 (0.012) C=3015 (0.014) C=3533 (0.02) C=3299 (0.021) C=3249 (0.017)
T=1723 -0.009 T=921 -0.018 T=802 0.001 T=748 0.015 T=975 -0.024
C=4753 (0.015) C=2620 (0.019) C=2133 (0.02) C=2253 (0.024) C=2500 (0.022)
T=1722 -0.056 T=920 -0.586 T=802 0.566 T=748 -0.305 T=974 0.005
C=4749 (0.894) C=2618  (1.291) C=2131 (1.306) C=2249 (1.565) C=2500 (1.042)
T=1723 -0.865 T=921 -0.564 T=802 -1.35 T=748 -1.181 T=975 -0.653
C=4748 (0.594) C=2619 (0.759) C=2129 (0.92) C=2250 (0.894) C=2498 (0.72)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. propensity score matching estimates by Kernel matching.  ATT: average treatment effect on the treated. Standard errors in parentheses.
C represents the control units whereas T represents the treated units.
Dependent Variable
Full Sample Men Women Urban
t-stat Obs. t-stat
Rural
Worked (Previous Week)
Worked (Previous Year)
Informality
Hours per Week
Weeks per Year
Obs. t-stat Obs. t-stat Obs. Obs. t-stat
-0.33 -0.88 0.16 0.14 -0.47
-0.91
-0.01
0.63
-0.20
-1.32
0.03
-0.63
-0.06
-1.46
0.16
0.06
0.43
-1.47
-0.37
-0.91
-0.45
-0.74
-0.02
-1.11
0.01
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Table 12: Descriptive Statistics and T-Test Between Attritors and Non-Attritors 
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Observations Mean Std. Dev.
Age 35090 29.19 20.34 2448 30.29 21.09 -2.52
Male 36510 0.49 0.50 2557 0.46 0.50 3.27
Married 35060 0.46 0.50 2437 0.41 0.49 4.17
Elementary School 36511 0.38 0.49 2557 0.27 0.45 12.20
Junior High School 36511 0.15 0.36 2557 0.14 0.35 1.25
Senior High School 36511 0.14 0.35 2557 0.21 0.41 -7.91
Higher Education 36511 0.05 0.22 2557 0.12 0.33 -11.29
Proxy Means Tested Score 33879 35.73 18.84 2235 31.18 20.40 10.26
Health Status 17576 2.07 0.46 928 2.09 0.50 -1.41
Household Size 36511 6.70 2.94 2557 6.37 3.53 4.71
Household' Head Age 36463 47.50 13.46 2541 47.40 16.76 0.30
Household Head is Female 36511 0.14 0.34 2557 0.21 0.41 -8.95
Number of Children under 12 years old 36511 1.42 1.23 2557 0.99 1.07 19.22
Worked in the Previous Week 17583 0.61 0.49 935 0.52 0.50 5.25
Hours per Week 12261 37.00 24.71 545 42.49 27.23 -4.62
Informal Status 12281 0.76 0.43 546 0.59 0.49 8.08
Presence of Asphalt Road 28349 0.80 0.40 1402 0.91 0.28 -13.93
% of Households with Electricity 28127 84.27 21.56 1394 90.77 15.10 -15.33
Number of Health Centers 28347 7.36 6.58 1396 9.10 7.80 -8.16
Presence of Piped Water 28507 0.55 0.50 1402 0.79 0.40 -22.04
Presence of a Sewage System 28507 0.54 0.50 1402 0.77 0.42 -19.61
Subjective Village Wealth 28507 3.17 0.71 1402 3.29 0.71 -6.07
Urban Area 36511 0.48 0.50 2557 0.73 0.44 -28.03
Present in both surveys Present only in 2000
t-test Variable
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Table 13: Binary Dependent Variable Model of Attrition Using Baseline Values 
    
Variables P(Absent in 2007 | Present in 2000)
Age 0.00***
(0.00)
Male -0.01
(0.00)
Married 0.02***
(0.01)
Elementary School -0.01
(0.01)
Junior High School 0.00
(0.01)
Senior High School 0.00
(0.01)
Higher Education 0.04***
(0.01)
Proxy means tested Score 0.00**
(0.00)
Health Status -0.00
(0.00)
Household Size -0.00
(0.00)
Household' Head Age 0.00
(0.00)
Household Head is Female 0.01
(0.01)
Number of Children <12  -0.01***
(0.00)
Worked in the previous Week -0.01
(0.01)
Hours per Week 0.00**
(0.00)
Informal Status -0.01***
(0.00)
Presence of Asphalt Road -0.00
(0.01)
% of Households with electricity 0.00
(0.00)
Number of Health Centers 0.00***
(0.00)
Presence of Piped Water 0.01**
(0.00)
Presence of a Sewage System 0.01
(0.00)
Subjective Village Wealth -0.00
(0.00)
Urban Area 0.02***
(0.01)
Obervations 10,428
R-squared 0.03
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 14: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status (without Trimming) 
 
 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev t-stat
Individual Characteristics
Age 33.21 12.11 33.05 12.07 33.86 12.23 -3.05
Male 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.35
Married 0.67 0.47 0.67 0.47 0.68 0.47 -1.01
Elementary School 0.43 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.52 0.50 -10.85
Junior High School 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.39 2.15
Senior High School 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.14 0.35 13.81
Higher Education 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26 0.02 0.15 13.03
Health Status 2.03 0.43 2.02 0.43 2.05 0.43 -2.92
Askes 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.23 12.63
Jamsostek 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.14 8.08
Household Characteristics
Proxy means tested Score 34.78 18.61 33.43 18.58 40.86 17.48 -19.35
Household's Head Age 46.60 12.09 46.56 12.03 45.33 12.51 -0.89
Household Size 6.33 2.69 6.34 2.69 6.26 2.70 1.43
Household Head is Female 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.14 0.35 -3.31
Number of Children Under 12 Years 1.21 1.13 1.21 1.12 1.23 1.16 -0.95
Health Card 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.39 0.32 0.47 -14.24
Unconditional Cash Transfer 0.21 0.41 0.14 0.35 0.51 0.50 -35.52
Community Level Characteristics
Presence of Asphalt Road 0.81 0.39 0.81 0.39 0.80 0.40 0.97
Presence of a Midwife 0.55 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.63 0.48 -9.78
Percentage of Households with Electricity 84.77 21.75 85.63 21.12 80.83 24.07 9.38
Presence of a sewage system 0.56 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.52 0.50 4.12
Presence of Piped Water 0.59 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.53 0.50 5.95
Number of Health Centers 7.76 6.65 7.93 6.81 6.96 5.82 7.41
Subjective Village Wealth 3.18 0.68 3.19 0.67 3.13 0.73 3.92
Urban Area 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.44 0.50 6.50
Province Dummies
Lives in North Sumatra 0.06 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.20 5.80
Lives in Yogyakarta 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26 -2.70
Lives in West Sumatra 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 1.94
Lives in East Java 0.16 0.36 0.17 0.37 0.12 0.32 6.66
Lives in South Sumatra 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.24 -5.06
Lives in West Nusa Tenggara 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.23 0.12 0.32 -9.68
Lives in Jakarta 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31 0.05 0.21 11.56
Lives in South Kalimantan 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.21 0.03 0.18 3.22
Lives in West Java 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.34 -1.49
Lives in South Sulawesi 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.26 -3.68
Lives in Central Java 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.18 0.39 -6.29
Lives in Bali 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20 3.76
Observations 13963 11289 2612
Explanatory Variables 
Full Sample Non Treated Treated 
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Table 15: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status (after Trimming) 
 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev t-stat
Individual Characteristics
Age 33.60 12.40 33.45 12.44 34.00 12.25 -1.84
Male 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.08
Married 0.67 0.47 0.67 0.47 0.68 0.46 -1.21
Elementary School 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.56 0.50 -3.78
Junior High School 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.38 3.27
Senior High School 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.32 5.24
Higher Education 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.09 4.05
Health Status 2.05 0.43 2.05 0.43 2.05 0.44 -0.06
Askes 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.22 4.19
Jamsostek 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.26
Household Characteristics
Proxy means tested Score 40.32 17.43 39.64 17.50 42.70 16.83 -19.35
Household's Head Age 46.73 12.30 46.75 12.27 46.68 12.38 0.21
Household Size 6.34 2.74 6.37 2.78 6.25 2.63 1.91
Household Head is Female 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.35 -1.48
Number of Children < 12 1.21 1.15 1.21 1.14 1.24 1.17 -1.24
Health Card 0.30 0.46 0.27 0.45 0.36 0.48 -7.67
Unconditional cash transfer 0.34 0.47 0.25 0.43 0.59 0.49 -29.17
Community Level Characteristics
Presence of Asphalt Road 0.81 0.39 0.81 0.39 0.80 0.40 0.98
Presence of a Midwife 0.62 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.65 0.48 -3.63
% of Households with Electricity 81.60 23.35 82.21 22.84 79.46 24.83 4.64
Presence of a sewage system 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.50 4.12
Presence of Piped Water 0.54 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.51 0.50 5.95
Number of Health Centers 6.80 5.19 6.83 5.24 6.60 4.98 1.86
Subjective Village Wealth 3.15 0.69 3.16 0.67 3.12 0.74 2.53
Urban Area 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.43 0.50 2.88
Province Dummies
Lives in North Sumatra 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17 1.25
Lives in Yogyakarta 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 1.11
Lives in West Sumatra 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.23 0.04 0.19 3.78
Lives in East Java 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 1.02
Lives in South Sumatra 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.07 0.25 -2.42
Lives in West Nusa Tenggara 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28 0.14 0.34 -5.96
Lives in Jakarta 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.17 2.71
Lives in South Kalimantan 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.17 2.50
Lives in West Java 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 -1.27
Lives in South Sulawesi 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.34
Lives in Central Java 0.18 0.39 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40 -1.82
Lives in Bali 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 2.67
Explanatory Variables 
Full sample Non Treated Treated 
Observations 8874 6548 2264
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Table 16.a: Descriptive Statistics for Pre-Treatment Labor Market Outcomes by 
Treatment (before Trimming) 
 
Table 16.b: Descriptive statistics for Post-Treatment Labor Market Outcomes by 
Treatment (before Trimming) 
 
Table 16.c: Descriptive statistics for Pre-treatment Labor Market Outcomes by 
Treatment (after Trimming) 
 
Table 16.d: Descriptive Statistics for Post-Treatment Labor Market Outcomes by 
Treatment (after Trimming) 
Observations Observations
(Non-Treated) (Treated) Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Informality 8049 1973 0.58 0.49 0.56 0.50 -1.67
Worked(Previous  year) 11289 2612 0.67 0.47 0.72 0.45 -5.55
Worked(Previous yeek) 11288 2612 0.62 0.49 0.65 0.48 -3.02
Hours per week 8044 1972 37.95 24.15 35.35 24.31 4.27
Weeks per year 8044 1973 41.00 15.21 39.38 16.24 4.01
Dependent Variables
Non-Treated Treated
t-stat
Observations Observations
(Non-Treated) (Treated) Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Informality 8247 1954 0.65 0.48 0.72 0.45 -6.31
Worked(Previous  year) 11282 2608 0.78 0.42 0.79 0.41 -1.84
Worked(Previous week) 10787 2506 0.74 0.44 0.74 0.44 0.13
Hours per week 8384 1964 39.23 22.76 36.03 22.34 5.70
Weeks per year 8381 1967 42.61 13.42 40.82 14.51 4.99
Dependent Variables
Non-Treated Treated
t-stat
Observations Observations
(Non-Treated) (Treated) Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Informality 4753 1723 0.62 0.49 0.59 0.49 2.15
Worked(Previous  Year) 6548 2264 0.68 0.46 0.73 0.44 -4.10
Worked(Previous Week) 6547 2264 0.62 0.49 0.65 0.48 -2.83
Hours per Week 4749 1722 36.60 24.35 34.80 24.14 2.64
Weeks per Year 4748 1723 39.90 15.74 39.04 16.44 1.88
Dependent Variables
Non-Treated Treated
t-stat
Observations Observations
(Non-Treated) (Treated) Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Informality 4854 1704 0.72 0.45 0.74 0.44 -1.82
Worked(Previous  Year) 6545 2262 0.78 0.41 0.79 0.41 -0.70
Worked(Previous Week) 6298 2506 0.74 0.44 0.74 0.44 0.38
Hours per Week 4919 1714 38.07 22.52 35.77 22.20 3.67
Weeks per Year 4912 1716 42.03 13.84 40.59 14.71 3.55
Dependent Variables
Non-Treated Treated
t-stat
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Table 17: Results of the Matching Equation 
Coeff. Std. error z P>z
Age (0.00)        0.00             -1.12 0.261
Male 0.05         0.03             1.53 0.127
Married 0.02         0.04             0.34 0.731
Elementary School (0.09)        0.05             -1.73* 0.084
Junior High School (0.12)        0.06             -1.83* 0.067
Senior High School (0.24)        0.07             -3.42*** 0.001
Higher Education (0.46)        0.15             -2.97*** 0.003
Proxy means tested Score 0.01         0.00             5.92*** 0
Household Size 0.02         0.01             2.25** 0.025
Household's Head Age (0.00)        0.00             -1.48 0.14
Presence of Asphalt Road 0.16         0.05             3.47*** 0.001
Subjective Village Wealth 0.09         0.03             3.54*** 0
Household Head is Female 0.04         0.05             0.81 0.421
Health Status 0.03         0.04             0.93 0.351
Health Card 0.31         0.03             9.14*** 0
Presence of a Midwife (0.04)        0.04             -1.01 0.314
Number of Children < 12 (0.04)        0.02             -2.43 0.015
Number of Health Centers (0.02)        0.00             -3.95*** 0
% Households with Electricity (0.00)        0.00             -2.32** 0.02
Presence of Piped Water (0.01)        0.04             -0.22 0.829
Presence of a sewage system (0.17)        0.04             -4.26*** 0.00
Urban Area 0.20         0.04             4.57*** 0
Lives in North Sumatra 0.14         0.12             1.18 0.237
Lives in Yogyakarta 0.72         0.12             6.05*** 0
Lives in West Sumatra 0.16         0.12             1.34 0.179
Lives in East Java 0.19         0.10             1.86* 0.063
Lives in South Sumatra 0.70         0.11             6.28*** 0
Lives in Bali 0.42         0.12             3.45*** 0.001
Lives in West Nusa Tenggara 0.83         0.11             7.8*** 0
Lives in Jakarta 0.26         0.13             2.06** 0.04
Lives in South Kalimantan 0.20         0.12             1.63 0.104
Lives in West Java 0.58         0.10             5.68*** 0
Lives in South Sulawesi 0.48         0.11             4.38*** 0
Lives in Central Java 0.50         0.10             5.04*** 0
Askes (0.05)        0.08             -0.61 0.542
Jamsostek 0.12         0.11             1.07 0.284
Unconditional cash transfer 0.92         0.03             27.66*** 0
Constant (1.84)        0.18             -10.04*** 0
Observations 
Log likelihood
Pseudo R-Squared
Explanatory variables 
Dependent variable: Askeskin
8673
-4399
0.1127
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Table 18: Propensity Score Matching with Difference in Differences Results for the Different Subgroups 
 
 
 
 
 
ATT ATT ATT ATT ATT
s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e.
T =2184 -0.03** T= 987 0.005 T=1197 -0.058*** T=1017 -0.033 T=1167 -0.026
C=6298 (0.015) C=2850 (0.019) C=3448 (0.022) C=3152 (0.024) C=3146 (0.02)
T=2262 -0.02 T=1036 0.013 T=1226 -0.047** T=1053 -0.034** T=1209 -0.008
C=6545 (0.014) C=3014 (0.011) C=3531 (0.021) C=3297 (0.02) C=3248 (0.018)
T=1704 0.002 T=919 0.002 T=785 0.001 T=743 -0.035 T=961 0.028
C =4854 (0.02) C=2578 (0.023) C=2276 (0.021) C=2294 (0.027) C=2560 (0.022)
T=1714 -1.188 T= 926 -0.247 T=788 -2.522* T=750 -2.631* T=964 -0.097
C=4919  (0.972) C=2620 (1.408) C=2299 (1.523) C=2336 (1.484) C=2583 (1.189)
T=1716 -1.071 T=927 -0.287 T=789 -2.11** T=750 -1.156 T=966 -0.981
C=4912 (0.66) C=2618 (0.839) C=2294 (0.976) C=2329 (1.098) C=2583 (0.927)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Propensity score matching estimates by Kernel matching.  ATT: average treatment effect on the treated. Standard errors in parentheses.
C represents the control units whereas T represents the treated units. 
-1.457
0.105
-1.222
-1.619
-2.27
0.068
-1.657
-2.163
1.12
0.09
-0.176
-0.342
-0.42
1.29
-0.08
-1.06
-1.675
-1.303
-1.773
-1.052
Obs. t-stat
-1.97 0.284 -2.585 -1.407 -1.30
Rural
Worked (Previous Week)
Worked (Previous Year)
Informality
Hours per Week
Weeks per Year
Obs. t-stat Obs. t-stat Obs.
Dependent Variable
Full Sample Men Women Urban
t-stat Obs. t-stat
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Table 19: Propensity Score Matching with Difference in Differences Results by Gender and Urban Status 
 
 
 
ATT ATT ATT ATT
s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e.
T=450 -0.045* T=537 0.029 T =567 -0.038 T=630 -0.059
C=1452 (0.025) C=1398 (0.021) C=1700 (0.027) C=1748 (0.026)
T=473 -0.027 T=563 0.024* T=580 -0.046** T=646 -0.042*
C=1553 (0.02) C=1461 (0.014) C=1744 (0.022) C=1787 (0.023)
T=349 -0.004 T=481 0.03 T=245 0.024 T=338 0.025
C=1081 (0.032) C=1218 (0.029) C=681 (0.03) C=921 (0.025)
T=350 -2.778 T=483 1.356 T=248 -3.994* T=338 -0.989
C=1105 (1.74) C=1231 (1.508) C=692 (2.169) C=930 (1.971)
T=350 -0.512 T=485 -0.015 T=248 -0.363 T=339 -1.415
C=1103 (1.115) C=1232 (0.916) C=689 (1.245) C=928 (0.979)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. propensity score matching estimates by Kernel matching.  ATT: average treatment effect on the treated. 
C represents the control units whereas T represents the treated units. Standard errors in parentheses.
-1.345
-0.128
-1.597
-0.459
-2.123
0.796
-1.841
-0.292
1.651
1.053
0.899
-0.016
-1.801
1.006
-0.502
-1.445
-1.83 1.37 -1.40 -2.31Worked (Previous Week)
Worked (Previous Year)
Informality
Hours per Week
Weeks per Year
Obs. t-stat Obs. t-stat Obs.
Dependent Variable
Men in Urban Area Men in Rural Area Women in Urban Area Women in Rural Area 
t-stat Obs. t-stat
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Table 20: Propensity Score Matching with Difference in Differences Results by Education Level 
 
 
 
ATT ATT ATT
s.e. s.e. s.e.
T=1529 -0.038** T=345 -0.014 T=310 -0.01
C=3768 (0.017) C=1,208 (0.035) C=1,321 (0.042)
T=1577 -0.013 T=359 -0.052 T=326 -0.008
C=3909 (0.015) C=1,250 (0.038) C=1,386 (0.047)
T=1054 0.032 T=203 -0.05 T=156 -0.004
C=2558 (0.024) C=678 (0.042) C=665 (0.062)
T=1057 -0.942 T =204 -1.803 T=158 -3.527
C=2587 (1.229) C  = 696 (2.784) C=675 (3.03)
T=1058 -1.883** T=206 -0.08 T=158 0.919
C=2579 (0.893) C=697 (1.828) C=676 (2.392)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. propensity score matching estimates by Kernel matching.  ATT: average treatment effect on the treated. 
C represents the control units whereas T represents the treated units. Standard errors in parentheses.
-0.885
1.292
-0.767
-2.11
-0.18
-0.063
-1.164
0.384
-1.392
-1.193
-0.648
-0.044
-2.23 -0.39 -0.23Worked (Previous Week)
Worked (Previous Year)
Informality
Hours per Week
Weeks per Year
Obs. t-stat Obs. t-stat Obs.
Dependent Variable
Elementary school and less Junior High School Senior High School and Higher  
t-stat
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Table 21: Propensity Score Matching with Difference in Differences Results for Groups with Higher Value for Askeskin 
 
 
ATT ATT ATT
s.e. s.e. s.e.
T=890 -0.072*** T=1330 -0.017 T=307 -0.075**
C=2658 (0.026) C=3710 (0.017) C=600 (0.038)
T=904 -0.072*** T=1370 -0.009*** T=311 -0.005
C=2702 (0.023) C=3843 (0.016) C=845 (0.027)
T=563 -0.007 T=1068 -0.012 T=153 -0.064
C=1727 (0.019) C=2953 (0.013) C=489 (0.046)
T=564 -0.931 T=1073 -0.648 T=253 0.293
C= 1745 (1.68) C=3003 (1.184) C=646 (2.448)
T=565 -1.253 T=1074 -1.653** T=254 -0.846
C=1742 (1.266) C=2997 (0.731) C=644 (1.636)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. propensity score matching estimates by Kernel matching.  ATT: average treatment effect on the treated. 
C represents the control units whereas T represents the treated units. Standard errors in parentheses.
-3.141
-0.382
-0.554
-0.99
-0.172
-1.383
0.12
-0.517
-3.122
-0.894
-0.547
-2.261
-2.75 -0.99 -1.99Worked (Previous Week)
Worked (Previous Year)
Informality
Hours per Week
Weeks per Year
Obs. t-stat Obs. t-stat Obs.
Dependent Variable
Married Women 35 to 65 years of age Lower Health Status
t-stat
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Table 22: Propensity Score Matching Estimates of Transition Probabilities between Formality and Non 
Employment 
 
 
ATT
s.e.
T=572 0.004
C= 1492 (0.024)
T=841 -0.016
C=2409 (0.015)
T=841 0.016
C=2409 (0.015)
T=334 -0.017
C=1152 (0.033)
T=334 0.017
C=1152 (0.031)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. propensity score matching estimates by Kernel matching.  
C represents the control units whereas T represents the treated units. 
ATT: average treatment effect on the treated. Standard errors in parentheses.
Transitions Obs. t-stat
0.166
-1.05
1.088
-0.532
0.559
Formal to Informal 
Informal to Informal 
Informal to Formal
Unemployment to Informal
Unemployment to Formal
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Figure 1: Histogram of Public Health Expenditure in Indonesia between 1995 and 
2007  
Source: World Bank (2008) 
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Figure 2: Kernel Density Graph of the Propensity Score without Trimming the 
Common Support Area 
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Figure 3: Kernel Density Graph of the Propensity Score after Trimming the 
Common Support Area 
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Appendix A: Details of the Computation of the Proxy Means Tested Score 
 
Data from several waves of the Susenas survey was combined for several years 
prior to the implementation of the program and a binary dependent variable model (logit) 
was implemented on household expenditure in order to determine the best predictor 
variables for each district (Cameron and Shah, 2014). Weights at the district level were 
obtained from such estimations. Consequently, a survey was designed to collect data on 
those variables.  
For targeting purposes, community leaders recommended to the BPS a list of poor 
households. The government sent enumerators to survey the households using the 
PSE05. The answers to the survey were converted the reclassification in Table A.1. 
I used the original weights computed by the BPS, to compute the simulated proxy 
means tested score in my analysis. Let Xij denote one of the i
th indicator variable for 
household j, let Wik denote the weight calculated for the i
th variable in district k. The 
computation of the proxy-means-tested score in calculated in the following way: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 − 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 100 ∗ ∑ Wik
18
i=1
∗ Xij 
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Table A.1: Proxy Means Tested Scoring System Used for Identification of 
Recipients of Government-Sponsored Poverty Allocation Programs: 
 
 
 
 
 
Poor Non-Poor
House Floor Area 1 if the floor area < 15 meters squared 0 if the floor area > 15 meters squared 
House Floor Type 1 if the floor type is made of soil 0 if the floor type is a non-soil material 
House Wall Type 1 if the wall is made of bamboo 0 if the wall is made of concrete or wood 
Household Toilet Facility 1 if the toilet is public or other 0 if the toilet is private 
Drinking Water Source 1 if it is an unprotected spring or river 0 if it is mineral, piped or a protected spring 
Source of Lighting 1 if the light source is electricity 0 if it isn't electricity 
Fuel Used 1 if it is wood or charcoal 0 if it is gas or electricity 
Frequency of Meat Purchased 1 if HH never buys meat or once a week 0 if it is twice a week or more 
Meal Frequency 1 if the HH consumes 1 or 2 meals a day 0 if it is more than 2 meals a day 
Frequency of Clothes Purchased 1 if never or once (previous year) 0 if more than once (previous year)
Accessibility to Health Center 1 if non-accessible 0 if accessible 
Employment Sector of HH 1 if agriculture 0 if non-agriculture 
Highest Education Level of HH 1 if junior high school or below 0 if above junior high school
Asset Possession: Savings 1 if not in possession 0 if in possession 
Asset Possession: Gold 1 if not in possession 0 if in possession 
Asset Possession: Television 1 if not in possession 0 if in possession 
Asset Possession: Livestock 1 if not in possession 0 if in possession 
Asset Possession: Vehicle 1 if not in possession 0 if in possession 
Scoring System 
Variable 
